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Summary
To meet the commitments of Kyoto protocol, three trading mechanisms are designed to reduce
carbon emissions at low social costs. In these mandatory markets, emission allowance and
related nancial derivatives can be traded among polluting companies and speculators. Pricing
the allowance is the fundamental quantitative problem in emission market and the optimal
control models can achieve this objective. A novel regulatory policy is also elaborated for the
policy makers that a combination of cap-and-trade scheme and tax/subsidy scheme will benet
the emission market both in economy and environment. Furthermore, numerical applications
of our models to the rising Chinese emission market are established to assess the performance
of the newly founded market and to give suggestions accordingly. Finally, European options in
EU ETS and Asian options in CDM are evaluated for the policy makers to better combating
the environmental problems.
Power stations are the largest sources of carbon emission globally. Therefore we focus on
an energy mix model in Chapter 3, where the equilibrium allowance price solution is reduced
to a xed point equation. Furthermore, instead of separating the seemingly controversial
schemes, a combination of emission trading and tax/subsidy policies can actually reduce the
windfall prots substantially. This model is simple and applicable both for the regulatory
agency to accommodate a better market scheme and for the CO2 polluters to adjust their
trading methods.
The most troubling problem for EU ETS now is the low allowance price which fails to
motivate the emission reductions. The disorder of the allowance price between dierent periods
of EU ETS seems inevitable. A multi-period energy mix model in Chapter 4 is provided to
overcome this problem by the indicator of the "Implied allowance shortage".
Since the rapid development of Chinese emission market, an useful model which can specif-
ically analyze this newly founded market is in urgent need. Current quantitative models can
only solve the European type options. However, an HJB approach in Chapter 5 can ll this
gap both theoretically and numerically. A closed form solution of the allowance price is avail-
v
vi
able under particular assumptions and the general situation can also be approached eectively




The global warming and its severe consequences have gained more and more attentions all over
the world. Especially nowadays nearly every aspect of economic activities brings about carbon
emissions. Furthermore, there is a worldwide consensus that the global warming is essentially
caused by the excessive carbon emissions since the industrial revolution. As observed from
Figure 1.1 1, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has predicted that the
global temperature will increase about 4 degrees by 2100 compared to 1900's level. Even
worse, scientic research reveals that within 20 to 30 years, we will suer from substantial
economic and environmental damages if no further measures are taken to curb the increasing
carbon emissions. Fortunately, in the past decades, institutions and policy makers have been
trying to discuss and learn from theoretical and practical experiences, in order to cut the
carbon emissions to an ideal level.
x 1.1.1 Externality
Economists believe that pollution is an outcome of externality, which is dened by \the cost
or benet that aects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benet" [1].
There are two kinds of externalities in the market, namely the positive externality and
negative externality. For example, education induces positive externality because gaining
knowledge makes people contribute to the whole society while industrial productions give rise
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate change
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to negative externality because pollution is the inevitable byproduct of production.
Figure 1.1: Climate change.
Actually, externality has long been a microeconomic theory that economists consider the
pollution as a consequence of taking resources like air and water without paying anything. In
a competitive market, if companies can obtain the environmental resources by free, then they
will gain interests until their marginal prot is zero regardless of how much pollution being
caused. Therefore the polluted rms will excessively contaminate the environment due to the
ignorance of productive externality. The implication of this phenomenon in economic policy
is very clear that the polluted companies need to pay a price equal to the marginal cost of
their external activities by compulsory. There are at least two popular measures to remedy
this problem which were discussed in theory and practice: tax/subsidy and emission trading.
x 1.1.2 Tax/Subsidy
We can learn from \Pigovian tax" to internalize the social cost of pollution by tax/subsidy
method. \Pigovian tax" is dened as the tax applied to a market activity that generating
negative externality [2]. Observed from Figure 1.2 2, the quantity of emission is relatively
high before the tax is introduced. When imposing a unit tax on the marginal private cost, an
upward shifting occurs by a revenue of the tax and therefore the pollution reduces to a more
environmentally friendly level. It is also noteworthy that the marginal social cost increases
with tax as a reection that we consume the clean air by paying tax.
Subsidy, on the other hand, can be considered as a reverse process of tax. Instead of
penalizing the polluting enterprises, policy makers reward them with money or other forms
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian tax
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of bonus for each unit of emission abatement. In early ages, subsidy was believed to maintain
the same marketable and environmental eects as tax. However, later [3] found that there
exists a very important asymmetry between tax and subsidy. The authors pointed out that
tax and subsidy are very dierent in terms of the prots of the producers such that subsidy
increases the prots while tax decreases them. A comprehensive analysis of tax and subsidy
attributes to [4].
Figure 1.2: How the Pigovian tax works to pollution.
x 1.1.3 Marketable permits
The root of the externality problem is the undened right claimed by [5], which is one of
the most important and fundamental articles in the emission eld. They illustrate that if a
clear and compelling denition of obtaining the clean air is claried, market participants will
utilize every aspect of legal and marketable measures to maintain and optimize an acceptable
externality standard for the whole society. According to [5], it is natural to introduce the
marketable instruments as the permit, meaning \the right to emit one unit of emission without
being penalized".
Theoretically, tax and permits are equivalent in the sense that the regulators can always
set a tax price and then adjust it until a reasonable emission reduction is fullled. However,
in reality, this is almost impossible because the possibility for the regulator to stipulate an
optimal tax continuously is negligible. For example, if the tax is too low, the environmental
burdens will exceed the expected standard. On the other hand, if the tax is too high, it will
cost substantial amount of social resources to meet the environmental protection requirement.
In the end, policy makers need to change the tax policy periodically and frequently which
may result in market disorder. Even worse, the pollution will possibly not be controlled
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under this scenario since companies always have the option to pay tax rather than to abate
emissions. Actually, in the early stages of EU ETS, regulators tend to utilize the tax to solve
environmental problems [6]. However, practical experiences demonstrate that the setting of
tax is always too low to provide a clear cost signal at the margin.
The rst real emission trading market in application is the SO2 emission trading program.
Policy makers in the U.S. discovered that marketable permit is superior to tax/subsidy because
it is more eective in encouraging pollution control.
Emission trading scheme for sulfur dioxide organized by American Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (AEPA) is enacted by the amendment bill to the 1990 clean air act. The purpose
of this scheme is to solve the acid rain problem by reducing 10 million tons of sulfur emission
annually.
This market in principle allows related energy powers to meet their emission abatement
target by either production reschedule or purchasing extra permits from other companies.
The exibility of emission market has been tremendously enhanced and the costs have also
been substantially reduced. Although it is unlikely to provide a precise cost savings compar-
ison between emission trading and tax/subsidy policies, there are evidence showing that the
increased compliance exibility of the emission trading could save up to 50% of the social
costs. There are ve most important experiences from SO2 market [7].
(i) Emission trading completes the main objective of emission reduction.
(ii) Emission strategy is an enhancement rather than a compromise to the environmental pro-
duction.
(iii) If the allowance (the right to emit one unit of emission) or credits are more liquid and
coherent, the emission trading will be more successful.
(iv) Banking (save the unused permits to the next period of the emission trade scheme) can
economically and environmentally improve the emission market.
(v) Initial allocation is crucial for the emission trading program.
x 1.2 Emission market under Kyoto protocol
Based on the previous context, in 1992, 155 countries signed the United Nations Framework
Convention Climate Change (UNFCCC). A famous treaty is the Kyoto protocol which was
suggested under UNFCCC in 1997 to set binding obligations on industrialized countries to
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. In order to meet the requirements of Kyoto protocol,
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dierent commitments were distributed to developing and developed countries.
x 1.2.1 Annex I and non-Annex I parties
It is estimated that the developed countries were responsible for approximately 77% of the
carbon emission from 1750 to 2004 [8]. Moreover, the average carbon consumption in devel-
oped countries is four times of that in developing countries now. Therefore, Kyoto protocol
sets dierent responsibilities between the Annex I countries which are required to reduce e-
missions according to their targets, and the non-Annex I countries which are exempted from
the binding abatement target. However, the non-Annex I countries are still committed to
moderate emission mitigation goals.
The connection between these two parties is that the developed countries can also receive
credits by nancing the developing countries in emissions. Furthermore, nowadays the voice
for involving developing countries into the emission reduction plan has drawn worldwide at-
tentions because there is more potential in these countries to mitigate emissions for the major
industries in developing countries consume energy in a less ecient way. For instance, in 2013
China opened carbon emission market in seven dierent cities and provinces in response to
the fact that China had been the No.1 carbon emission producer since 2011.
In addition, three mechanisms are designed to achieve the emission reduction target for
dierent parties, namely European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Joint Implementation
(JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
All these three mechanisms allow purchase and transfer among the countries which have
rectied the Kyoto protocol. However, an essential dierence between them is that they belong
to dierent forms of emission market. For example, EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system, in
which a central authority will set the cap or the limit on the whole society and allocate
permits to individual countries and companies. Furthermore, market participants can trade
the permits in order to comply with the emission restriction or gain prots. The cap-and-
trade system is the main form of the emission market and numerous articles have proved
that the cap-and-trade system can reduce the social cost signicantly while completing the
emission abatement target. JI and CDM, on the other hand, belong to the projected-based
transactions, in which trades usually happen between dierent countries. It is also notable
that forwards and futures contracts dominates the projected-based transactions.
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x 1.2.2 EU ETS
EU ETS is the rst, and currently the only, multinational scheme of all emission markets. It
covers about 80% value of the emission market in the world, consists of about half of the EU
carbon emission and is responsible for more than 12,000 electricity stations, factories and other
industrial enterprises. EU ETS allocates the emission reduction target to each EU members
who are allowed to assign obligations to dierent companies by themselves. Unfullled portion
of emission reduction will result in a unit penalty, which is 40 Euros in the rst period, and
100 Euros in the second and third periods of EU ETS. Moreover, the monetary penalty will
not exempt the oenders from remedying the requisite emission abatement target in the next
period. There have been three periods of EU ETS and each of them corresponds to a specic
objective of Kyoto Protocol.
The rst period (2005  2007) was expected as the "learning-by-doing" time. Not only
participated countries and companies looked forward to gaining experience, but also EU ETS
anticipated to learn from regulatory deciency and to accommodate their policies in order to
complete the commitment of Kyoto Protocol in a more eective way. Only CO2 was selected
to trade rather than the six greenhouse gases identied by Kyoto Protocol in this period. And
the selected installations were only limited to industries such as steel manufactures, power
stations above 20 MW capacity, mineral industrial. For the allowance price, a peak of more
than 30 Euros/tCO2 once ashed in April 2006. However, after the information was disclosed
that the permits in the market could easily cover the abatement requirement, the allowance
price fell to 1 Euro in less than a year and reached almost 0 at the end of 2007.
The second period (2008.1.1  2012.12.31) aimed at being consistent with the rst com-
mitment of Kyoto Protocol, which targeted at cutting the emission by 10% compared to
1990's level. Some new regulatory policies were also adopted to fulll this objective. The
EU members were allowed to expand the emission mechanisms to other industries and other
greenhouse gases. For instance, aviation had been included into carbon emission market since
2012. Banking(save the unused allowance to the next period of EU ETS) was also permitted
in this period while it was strictly prohibited before. Grandfathering, which means the regu-
latory agency distributes permits without charging, was still the primary problem impacting
the allowance price. Although increased to over 20 Euros/tCO2 in 2008, the allowance price
again fell tremendously to 6.67 Euros/tCO2 at the closure of the second period. Researches
pointed out that two other factors might also be responsible for the decline of the allowance
price: (i) the reduced output in energy-intensive sectors as a result of the recession, (ii) the
market perception of future fossil fuels prices might have been revised downwards [9].
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The third period (2013  2020) was anticipated to witness the real maturity of emission
market. EU ETS made an increment of the total reduction amount to 20% compared to 1990
level, being projected to be around 360 million tonnes annually. The allowance price was
aimed for an increasing to 22 Euros/tCO2 by 2020. Several changes had taken place in this
phase to accomplish this target: (i) the setting of an overall EU cap; (ii) lighter limits on
the use of osets; (iii) limit banking of allowance between phase two and phase three; (iv) a
move from grandfathering to auctioning. The success or failure of this phase leaves the future
market to test.
x 1.2.3 JI and CDM
Joint Implementation (JI) is one of the exibility mechanism designed for the Annex I countries
to trade Emission Reduce Unit (ERUs) among themselves to achieve their commitment goals.
Russian and Ukraine currently host the greatest number of the JI projects. By 2012, the total
number traded by JI is around 300 million Euros 3. However, the collapse of the allowance
price also threatens the existence of this mechanism.
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only exibility project that is responsible for
the developing countries under Kyoto protocol. CDM is targeted at two objectives: (i)assist
parties not included in the Annex I in achieving sustainable development, (ii) help developed
countries who are included in the Annex I purchase emission permit from developing countries,
in order to fulll their emission reduction targets more eciently.
Between 2001 and 2012, CDM has issued one billion CERs units. However, like EU ETS,
the low price also impacts the normal function of this scheme. More severe issue is from
the political resistance to guarantee its existence into the future, which is not related to the
analysis of this thesis. CDM allows industrialized countries to buy Certicated Emission
Reduction (CERs) and to invest in a cheaper way. The economic basis for CDM is that the
emission reduction is less expensive in developing countries and the potential for developing
countries to cut emission is huge since they usually take a less regulated environmental policy.
Nowadays, the rising emission market in China has witnessed the latent prosperous of CDM.





Literature review in emission market
x 2.1 Introduction
The publications on emission market are rather extensive and a general introduction can be
found in [10]. The rst rigorous mathematical model in emission market attributes to [11], in
which an equilibrium model is established. The most important conclusion of that paper is
that the equilibrium marketable permit exists and equals the marginal abatement cost. This
fundamental result has paved the way for numerous future articles and we will discuss this
paper thoroughly in this Chapter. Based on [11], [12] establishes the most comprehensive
quantitative model under the deterministic circumstance where in the continuous setting,
nite time and banking/borrowing are permitted. The most important result in [12] is that
the discounted marginal abatement cost remains constant and therefore the marketable permit
will increase by a riskless interest rate. [13] proves the same result independently for the
discrete time setting.
One of the early stochastic model is provided by [14] in which the motivations are inspired
by [12]. The author proposes the minimization problem of the producers' expected total
cost. It is the rst time that the equilibrium allowance price be implicitly analyzed under
the continuous time and innite domain settings. However, the explicit description of the
allowance price is still an unexplored area. [15] establishes a total dierent model, where
the CO2-regulated producers and speculators are analyzed separately under the stochastic
settings. An interesting result of their work demonstrates that the spot price will increase or
decrease according to the ratio between the regulated emitters and speculators. [16] is the
most powerful model to derive the allowance price numerically at that time. A fuel-switch
method is explored under dynamic price equilibrium and optimal market designs. We will
8
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introduce this paper explicitly in Chapter 2. Based on their work, [17] elaborates the allowance
prices as well as the product prices theoretically and numerically. Furthermore, the existence
of windfall prots (see [18] for details) is conrmed and the design of market to solve this
problem is approached simultaneously. Chapter 3 and 4 are extensions to their models.
The option pricing market has only been addressed recently. [19] analyzes the European
option under the assumption that an endogenous emission permit price is applied directly.
[20] utilizes the HJB equation to derive the spot price where this Chapter will present in
details. [21] also proposes the option specically in EU ETS. In their paper, the drift term
of the allowance price is determined by a hidden variable which demonstrates the shortage of
the allowance and the ltering method is engrained numerically. Chapter 5 is an extension to
their models.
x 2.2 Equilibrium model
In [11], the author rst provides an equilibrium market without the marketable permit. Con-
sider the multi-product rm i, whose abatement cost is given by G(yi1;    ; yiR; ei), where
(yi1; yi2;    ; yiR) is a combination of the production plan and ei is the emission. Given the




pryir  Gi(yi1;    ; yiR; ei):
If the assumptions hold that Gi is convex and twice dierentiable, the denition of the optimal
strategy (yi1; yi2;    ; yiR; ei) is demonstrated byX
r





pryir  Gi(yi1;    ; yiR; ei)]:
For an arbitrary ei, dene the optimal strategy fyir byX
r





pryir  Gi(yi1;    ; yiR; ei)]:





pr(yir  fyir)  [Gi(yi1;    ; yiR; ei) Gi(fyi1;    ; fyiR; ei)]:
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Therefore the argument of Gi is equivalent to the discussion of a single variable function Fi(ei).
For the vector of market participants' emission E = (e1; e2;    ; en), the optimal control





s:t: E  0 and EH  Q;
where Q is the air quality that the whole society aims to achieve and H is the overall
emission strategy. According to the convex analysis, the existence of the solutions for the
optimal control problem can be proved.
The extension of the current model to the market permit scenario is natural. Now let




pk(lik   l0ik): (2.1)
Based on the discussions above, the author provides an innovative denition of the market
equilibrium.
Denition 1 A market is said to be in equilibrium if there exists a nonnegative prices p,
such that ei solves the deterministic optimal control problem (4.24) under the constraints thatP
i(l









ik   l0ik)] = 0.
By rst order optimality condition(KKT condition from standard convex analysis), the equi-
librium exists and the equilibrium permit equals the marginal abatement cost.
Stochastic analysis has dominated the quantitative world for a long time and therefore the
deterministic setting has lost its power both theoretically and numerically. Still, this article
lays the foundation of future researches in emission market.
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x 2.3 Fuel-switch model
While the theoretical possibilities of the allowance price have been fully explored after the
pioneering work for [11], there is an urgent need for a reliable numerical method to simulate
the allowance price. [16] innovatively separates the abatement measures by short-term (no
initial investments, savings return within days) and long-term (high investments, savings
return over decades). Since the long term investment will take 20-30 years to implement,
they focus on short term abatement measures, namely fuel switch process, which benets the
optimal stochastic control model both in theory and numerical computations.
In their model, N 2 N market participants are producing electricity from fossil fuel and
trading carbon allowances at discrete times t 2 f0; 1;    ; Tg  N, where T corresponds
to the maturity time of one compliance period. They consider a ltered probability space
(
;F ;P; (Ft)Tt=0), in which all prices and strategies are included. (Eit)T 1t=0 represents fuel switch




in their model for computational convenience where P Tt is the zero coupon bond maturing at T .
The reduction amount for agent i within time [t; t+1) is it 2 [0; i]. Furthermore, A = (At)Tt=0
stands for the forward price with delivery time T of one carbon allowance certicate. In
order to enforce the market participants to trade, they introduce (it)
T 1
t=0 which represents the
number of forward contracts held by agent i = 1; 2;    ; N at time t. Moreover, the dierence
between emitted carbon and initially allocated allowances also belongs to the concerns of each
producer. They model it by a random variable  T which is FT -measurable. According to




it(At+1   At)  iTAT   ( i  
T 1X
t=0








where the spaces of adapted processes are introduced by
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L1 := f(t)T 1t=0 : t 2 L1(Ft); t = 0; : : : ; T   1g;
L1 := f(t)T 1t=0 : t 2 L1(Ft); t = 0; : : : ; T   1g;
U i := f(it)T 1t=0 : adapted [0; i]-valued processg;
U := Ni=1U i:
Therefore the market equilibrium, which is the theoretical foundation of many emission market
articles, can be introduced as follows.
Denition 2 Given a fuel switch price process (E it )T 1t=0 2 LN1 for each agent i = 1; : : : ; N , an
adapted process A = (At )
T
t=0 is said to be an equilibrium carbon price process, if there exists
a trading and an abatement strategies (i; i) 2 (L1L1)U i such that an optimal problem
(2.2) is solved by
EfIA;i(i; i)g  EfIA;i(i; i)g; for all (i; i) 2 (L1  L1) U i; (2.3)
under the constraint that
NX
i=1
it = 0; at any time t = 0; : : : ; T . (2.4)
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium, they dene the global optimization problem




















G() =  F ()  (   ())+; for  2 U :
The existence of the global optimality guarantees the existence of the equilibrium allowance
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price by the relationship
At = Ef1f  ()0g j Ftg; for t = 0; : : : ; T :
For t 2 [0; T ], the discounted fuel switch process is divided into
E(t) = P (t) +X(t);
where the deterministic part P (t) is composed by a linear increasing price and a seasonal price
uctuations




The stochastic part is modeled by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which can maintain the
mean-reverting property of the price evolution
dX(t) = ( X(t))dt+ dW (t):
Furthermore, the expected allowance demand is described by
 (t) := m+ vW 0(t) t 2 [0; T ];
where Wt and W
0
t are independent Winner process.
To attain the coecients, the trinomial tree method is utilized to the McCloskey North-
West Europe Steam Coal Index and on natural gas prices from National Balancing Point(NBP).
Instead of focusing the total allowance demand, they analyze the allowance price as well as





(T   t) ; t = 0; : : : ; T   1:
x 2.4 HJB model
[20] solves the continuous optimal stochastic control model by HJB equation. Their model
can be applied by both the central planner and the individual market participants and the
generality of their HJB approach is available for an extension to the logarithmic utility.
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Consider the stochastic process of emission rate yt such that
dyt = (t; yt)dt+ (t; yt)dWt:







ysdsjFtg; for t 2 [0; T ];
where ut denotes the abatement amount. Since Ef
R T
0
ysdsjFtg0tT is a martingale,
dxt =  utdt+G(t)dWt:
Here, the volatility of the uncontrolled stochastic part of xt is represented by G(t). The






e rtC(t; ut)dt+ e rTp(xT )g; (2.5)
where C(t; ut) =  12cu2t indicates the abatement cost and P (xT ) = min(0; p(e0 xT )) denotes
the total penalty amount at the compliance, in which p and e0 represent the unit penalty
price and initial allowance allocation respectively.
In order to provide a solution of problem (2.5), the author introduces a more general
optimal control problem:







Thus (2.5) is solved automatically if we obtain the answer to (2.6) since letting t = 0 leads















with the boundary condition
V (T; xT ) = e
 rTP (XT ):
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Because the spot price equals the marginal abatement cost [11], which is mathematically
equivalent to S(t; xt) = cut =  ert @v@x , the solution of the spot price can be directly derived
from the solution of (2.8).
Numerically, a closed form solution V can be attained by Cole-Hopf transformation if G(t)
is constant and r equals zero. For a more general case, the author concludes from the empirical
evidence that carbon emission market at the beginning of the second period works eciently
by comparing the autocorrelation returns between CO2, SO2 and DAX market levels, where
the latter two markets have endured decades and therefore are very mature.
Chapter 3
Single period energy mix model
Given the existing energy-generating technologies, we can analyze the performance of the
tradable pollution permit market. Within a general equilibrium framework, we show how the
architecture of a proposed emission trading scheme should be optimized with respect to the
allocation over energy production technologies presented in the market. Furthermore, a brief
discussion of the development of the newly founded Chinese emission market is provided.
x 3.1 Introduction
The idea to use market-based instruments for environmental protection has become popular
over recent decades and is now on the agenda of international negotiations.
First proposed by [22], the usage of tradable permits has a long history in practice and
research. The publications on this topic are rather extensive, and we refer the interested
readers to [10]. Real-world emission markets have introduced a stress test for the theory of
tradable pollution rights and revealed some of its weak points. This causes an intense debate
on the economic justication for emission markets. In view of volatile certicate prices, high
burdens to the consumers through increased electricity costs and windfall prots to generators,
the economic sense of emission trading is jeopardized if taken alternative solutions, such as
subsidiary of clean technologies and/or taxation of carbon emission.
The purpose of the present work is to show that arguing either in favor of emission trad-
ing or emission taxation is not the right approach. We demonstrate that diverse economic
invectives must be combined and composed in a right proportion to achieve an optimal eect.
More precisely, we present that the tax/subsidy and emission trading is naturally considered as
16
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controls of an integrated nancial mechanism, which is referred to as extended cap-and-trade
scheme, and will be presented and analyzed in details in the present work. By denition, an
extended cap-and-trade scheme simultaneously implements both, emission trading and sub-
sidy/taxation of production. The important point here is that the subsidy/taxation can be
simultaneously used in terms of two assets: The monetary units and the emission certicate
units. Furthermore, the regulations can be applied in a technology-sensitive way.
We introduce a quantitative tool to assess the performance of the extended cap-and-trade
scheme and show how to optimize the regulatory mechanism with respect to a wide range
of quality criteria. Our analysis takes into account and is based on the so-called energy mix
model, which describes the existing state of energy generation in terms of a given capacity
allocation of production over diverse technologies present in the market.
To explain how our contribution is related to other research in this eld, let us give a brief
overview on related work. The economic theory of allowance trading goes back to [22] and
[11]. Results in dynamic allowance trading are obtained in [13], [23], [12], [24], [14], [25], [15]
and in the literature cited therein. The experience gained from real-world emission market
operation is discussed in [26], and a detailed analysis of allowance prices from this market is
given in [27] and [28]. The contributions [29] and [30] are devoted to econometric modeling of
emission allowance prices. The dynamic price equilibrium is addressed in [16] and [17], which
provide a mathematical analysis of the market equilibrium and use optimal stochastic control
theory to show social optimality of emission trading schemes. A majority of relatively recent
papers [25], [19], [20], [31], [16], [17], [32], are related to equilibrium models, where risk neutral
individuals optimize the expected value of their prot or their cost function. The paper [33]
presents a model for the spot and the derivative contract pricing. The work [34] considers
equilibrium of risk averse market players and elaborates on its risk neutral dynamics. The
problems of derivative valuation in emission markets are addressed, among others in [19], [20],
[21] and [17].
x 3.2 Mathematical models
x 3.2.1 Emission market model
To explain the emission price mechanism, we present a market model where a nite number of
the agents, indexed by the set I, are confronted with abatement of pollution. In this work, we
consider a trading scheme in isolation, within a time horizon [0; T ], without credit transfer from
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and to other markets. That is, unused emission allowances expire worthless. Furthermore, we
assume that there is no production strategy adjustment within the compliance period [0; T ].
This means that the agents schedule their production plans for the entire period [0; T ] at the
beginning. The allowance can be traded twice: at time t = 0 at the beginning and at time
t = T immediately before emission reports are surrendered to the regulator. Finally, for the
sake of simplicity, we set the interest rate to zero. This one-period model is best suited to
explain the core mechanism of market operation and to discuss its properties.
The i-th agent is specied by the set i of feasible production plans for the generation
of energy (electricity) within one time period from t = 0 to t = T . Further, we consider
functions, dened on i, for each i 2 I
V i; C i; Ei : i ! [0;1); i0 7! V i(i0); Ci(i0); Ei(i0);
with the interpretation that for production plan i0 2 i, the values V i(i0), Ci(i0), and Ei(i0)
stand for the produced volume, total production costs, and total carbon dioxide emission,
respectively. The uncertainties will be modeled by random variables on the probability space
(
;F ;P).
Production: At t = 0, each agent i 2 I, faces the energy demand D0 2 R+ of the entire
market, the realized electricity price P0 2 R+, and the emission allowance price A0 2 R+.
Based on this information, each agent decides on its production plan i0 2 i, where i is the
set of all feasible production plans. Given i0 2 i, the agent realizes at the nal compliance
date T the
accumulated production costs C i(i0); (3.1)
and the total revenue P0V
i(i0); (3.2)
from the potentially sold energy generated by the own production plan i0.
Allowance trading: At times t = 0; T the allowance permits can be exchanged between agents




T the change at times t = 0; T
of the allowance number held by agent i 2 I. Such trading yields a revenue (a cost if it is
negative)
  #i0A0   #iTAT : (3.3)
Note that #i0 and A0 are deterministic, whereas #
i
T and AT are modeled as random variables.
Allowance allocation: We assume that the administrator allocates a pre-determined number
i0 2 [0;1) of allowances to each agent i. However, it is natural to suppose that each agent
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is confronted with emissions, which cannot be predicted with certainty at time t = 0 when
the production and trading decisions are made. On this account, the allowances i = i0 N i
eectively available for compliance are calculated by withdrawing non-predictable emissions
N i of the agent i 2 I from the initial allocation i0. That is, the allowance amount i eectively
available to the agent i 2 I is a random variable. Hence the total number  = Pi2I i, of
allowances eectively available for compliance is also random. Note that the random variables
(i)i2I yield the only source of randomness in our model. For later use, we introduce the
cumulative eect N of non-predictable demand uctuation as
0    =
X
i2I
N i = N:
Emission from production: Following the production plan i0, the total pollution of the agent
i is expressed as
Ei(i0): (3.4)
Penalty payment: As mentioned above, the penalty  2 [0;1) must be paid at maturity T for
each unit of pollutant not covered by allowances. Given the change in allowance number at
times t = 0; T by trading (#it)
T
t=0, the production 
i
0, and the eectively available allowances
i of the the agent i 2 I, the loss of the agent i due to potential penalty payment is given by
(Ei(i0)  #i0   #iT   i)+: (3.5)
Individual prot: In view of (3.1) { (3.5), the prot of the i-th agent following trading and




0) depends on the market prices (A;P ) = (A0; AT ; P0)
for allowances and energy and is given by
LA;P;i(#i; i) =  #i0A0   #iTAT   C i(i0) + P0V i(i0)
 (Ei(i0)  #i0   #iT   i)+: (3.6)
Note that with this denition, the individual prot could be negative.
Risk aversion and rational behavior: Suppose that the risk attitudes of each agent i 2 I are
described by a pre-specied strictly increasing, concave utility function U i : R ! R. With
this, agent's i 2 I rational behavior is targeted on the maximization of the functional
(#i; i) 7! E(U i(LA;P;i(#i; i)))
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Energy demand: Suppose that at time t = 0 all agents observe the total energy demand,
which is described by D0 2 R+. Let us agree that the demand must be covered.
Market equilibrium: Following standard apprehension, a realistic market state is described by
the so-called equilibrium | a situation where the allowance prices, all allowance positions,
and all production decisions are such that each agent is satised by his own policy and, at
the same time, natural restrictions are fullled.
Denition 3 Given energy demand D0 2 R+, the prices (A; P ) = (A0; AT ; P 0 ) are called
equilibrium prices, if, for each agent i 2 I, there exists a strategy (#i; i) = (#i0 ; #iT ; i0 ) such
that:
(i) the energy demand is covered X
i2I
V i(i0 ) = D0;
(ii) the emission certicates are in zero net supplyX
i2I
#it = 0 for t = 0 and t = T , (3.7)
(iii) each agent i 2 I is satised by his own policy in the sense that
E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i)))  E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i)) (3.8)
holds for any alternative strategy (#i; i).
The main objective of this section is to prove that, in the present model, the electricity price
formation is determined by the usual merit order arguments, where the eect of emission
regulation causes emission allowance prices to enter the production costs at the specic emis-
sion rate. This issue can be considered as a core mechanism of a cap-and-trade system, since
including pollution costs into nal product price causes a change of the merit order of pro-
duction technologies towards a cleaner production. To formulate this result, let us elaborate
on the opportunity costs and introduce additional denitions.
Opportunity costs and merit order: in the economic literature, it stands for the forgone
benet from using a certain strategy compared to the next best alternative. For example, the
opportunity costs of farming own land is the amount which could be obtained by renting the
land to someone else. Let us explain how the opportunity costs necessarily lead to windfall
prots.
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When facing energy (electricity) generation, producers consider a prot, which could be
potentially realized when, instead of production, unused emission allowances are sold to the
market. For instance, if the price of the emission certicates is 12 euros per tonne of CO2 and
the production of one Megawatt-hour (MWh) emits two tonnes of CO2 (say, using a coal-red
steam turbine), then the producer must decide between two strategies which are equivalent
in terms of their emission certicate balance:
 produce and sell one MWh to the market,
 not produce this MWh and sell allowances covering two tonnes of CO2.
In this situation, the opportunity costs of producing one MWh is 24 = 212 euros. Obviously,
the agent produces energy only if the rst strategy is at least as protable that the second.
Thereby, both the production and the opportunity costs must be considered in the formation
of the electricity market price. Clearly, if the production costs of electricity are 30 euros per
MWh, then the energy will be produced only if its price covers both the production and the
opportunity costs. Thus electricity can only be delivered at the price exceeding 54 = 30+212
euros. That is, in order to trigger the electricity production, the opportunity costs must be
added to the production costs. In the scientic community, this phenomena is well-known
under the name of cost-pass-through. An empirical analysis [18], conrms that the strategy of
cost-pass-through is currently followed by the European energy producers. Furthermore, the
detailed investigation of mathematical market models shows that the cost-pass-through is the
only possible strategy in the so-called equilibrium state of the market. This can be interpreted
as follows: when behaving optimally, the energy producers must pass the allowance price on
the consumers. We cannot blame the energy producers for this, even if the emission credits
are allocated free of charge.
More importantly, it turns out that the cost-pass-through is nothing but the core mech-
anism, responsible for the emission savings. Namely, due to the opportunity costs, clean
technologies appear cheaper than emission-intense production strategies. For instance, an
alternative generation (gas turbine) which yields energy at the price of 40 euros and emits
only one tonne of CO2, hardly competes with coal-red steam turbine under generic regime
(without emissions regulation). Namely, if there is no regulatory framework, then the the
coal-red steam turbine is scheduled rst and the gas turbine has to wait until the energy
demand cannot be covered by coal-red steam technology. However, given an emission regu-
lation, the opposite is true: say, if the allowance price is equal to 12 euro per tonne of CO2
as above, then the gas technology appears cheaper, operating at full costs of 52 = 40+ 1 12
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euros. Thus, the gas turbine is scheduled rst, followed by the coal-red steam turbine which
runs only if the installed gas turbine capacity does not cover the energy demand.
In the remaining part of this section, we show that the only rational behavior in the
equilibrium is to pass the opportunity costs on the consumers. For this, we require additional
notation.
Denition 4 [35] Consider a given energy amount d 2 R+ and allowance price a 2 R+.
i) Introduce the individual opportunity merit order costs of the agent i 2 I as
Ci(d; a) = inffCi(i0) + aEi(i0) : i0 2 i; V i(i0)  dg;
that is, Ci is the cost generated by the most cost-ecient production schedule i0, which con-
siders both, the direct costs and the opportunity costs, and satises the energy amount d. An
individual production plan i0 2 i is said to conform with opportunity costs at emission price
a if
Ci(V i(i0); a) = C i(i0) + aEi(i0): (3.9)
ii) Introduce the cumulative opportunity merit order costs as






0 2 i; i 2 I;
X
i2I
V i(i0)  dg:













iii) Any price p 2 R+ with the property that
 C( ~d; a) + p ~d   C(d; a) + pd for all ~d 2 R+
is referred to as an opportunity merit order electricity price at (d; a).
Remark. In the previous denition, notice that, if (3.9) in i) holds, i.e. each individual
production plan i0 2 i conforms with opportunity costs at emission price a, then, at aggregate
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x 3.2.2 Properties of equilibrium
With these denitions, we now show that, within any equilibrium, the production plans always
conform with opportunity costs. Furthermore, the equilibrium electricity price is always an
opportunity merit order price.
Proposition 1 [35] Given energy demand D0, let (A




0 ) be the equilibrium
prices with the corresponding strategies (#i; i); i 2 I, then the following points hold:
i) For each agent i 2 I, the individual production plan i0 conforms with the opportunity costs
at the emission price A0
Ci(V i(i0 ); A0) = C i(i0 ) + A0Ei(i0 ): (3.10)




















Proof. i) Consider the equilibrium strategy (#i0 ; 
i
0 ) of the agent i 2 I. Assume that the
agent deviates from this strategy following an alternative production plan i0 2 i. However
to keep the same emission credit balance, the dierence Ei(i0)   Ei(i0 ) is traded at the




T ) to an
alternative trading strategy (#i0; #
i




i(i0)  Ei(i0 ); #iT = #iT :





diers form the original prot
LA
;P ;i(#i; i) = LA






0 ) = P

0 [V
i(i0)  V i(i0 )] + [C i(i0 )  Ci(i0)] + A0[Ei(i0 )  Ei(i0)]:
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Indeed, a direct calculation shows
LA
;P ;i(#i0 + E
i(i0)  Ei(i0 ); i0) =  [#i0 + Ei(i0)  Ei(i0 )]A0   C i(i0)+
+P t V
i(i0)  fEi(i0)  [#i0 + Ei(i0)  Ei(i0 )]  Ei(i0)  ig+
=  #i0 A0   C i(i0)  A0[Ei(i0)  Ei(i0 )] + P 0 V i(i0)  [Ei(i0 )  #i0   i]+
= LA
;P ;i(#i; i) +

P 0 [V
i(i0)  V i(i0 )] + C i(i0 )  C i(i0) + A0[Ei(i0 )  Ei(i0)]
	
:
Note that the dierence R(i0; 
i
0 ) cannot be positive, since otherwise
LA
;P ;i(#i; i) > LA
;P ;i(#i; i);
which yields a contradiction
E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i))) > E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i)))
to the individual optimality (3.8) of the equilibrium strategy (#i; i). Now, from R(i0; 
i
0 ) 
0 we conclude that
  Ci(i0 )  A0Ei(i0 ) + P 0 V i(i0 )   C i(i0)  A0Ei(i0) + P 0 V i(i0) (3.13)
for each i0 2 i. With this, we conclude the desired assertion (3.10) as follows: any alternative
production plan i0 producing an energy amount V
i(i0) which is at least equal to V
i(i0 ), must
satisfy
Ci(i0 ) + A

0E
i(i0 )  Ci(i0) + A0Ei(i0):
Thus
C i(i0 ) + A

0E
i(i0 ) = inffC i(i0) + A0Ei(i0) : i0 2 i; V i(i0)  V i(i0 )g:
ii) Since
 Ci(V i(i0 ); A0) + P 0 V i(i0 )   C i(i0)  A0Ei(i0) + P 0 V i(i0)
  Ci(V i(i0); A0) + P 0 V i(i0)
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it holds that X
i2I














which implies the desired assertion (3.11).
iii) We need to prove that, for any ~d 2 R+,
 C( ~d;A0) + P 0 ~d   C(
X
i2I


































In particular, if the strategies are chosen from
f(i0)i2I : i0 2 i; i 2 I;
X
i2I
V i(i0)  ~dg; (3.16)




















+ P 0 ~d:
Passing on the right-hand side of this inequality to
C( ~d;A0) := inff
X
i2I





0 2 i; i 2 I;
X
i2I
V i(i0)  ~dg











V i(i0 )   C( ~d;A0) + P 0 ~d:
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Now, we show another natural property of the equilibrium allowance prices. It turns out that
there is no arbitrage for allowance trading and that the terminal allowance price is digital.
Proposition 2 [35] Given energy demand D0, let (A




0 ) be the equilibrium
prices with the corresponding strategies (#i; i) i 2 I.
(i) There exists a risk-neutral measure Q, equivalent to P, such that A = (A0; AT ) follows a
martingale with respect to Q:
A0 = EQ(AT ): (3.17)
(ii) If (3.27) holds, then the terminal allowance price in equilibrium is digital
AT = 1fE(i0 ) 0g: (3.18)
Proof. i) According to the rst fundamental theorem of asset pricing [36], the existence




is ensured by absence of arbitrage, which is in turn implied by equilibrium. That is, it suces
to verify that the equilibrium rules out all arbitrage opportunities for allowance trading. Let
us follow an indirect proof, supposing that 0 is an allowance trading arbitrage, meaning that
P(0(AT   A0)  0) = 1; P(0(AT   A0) > 0) > 0: (3.19)
Based on this we obtain a contradiction by showing that each agent i can change the own






















Indeed, the revenue improvement from allowance trading is
 ~#i0A0   ~#iTAT =  #i0A0   #iTAT + 0(AT   A0);
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which we combine with (3.19) to see that
P





LA;i(#i; i) < LA;i(~#i; i)

> 0
which implies Eq. (3.20), therefore contradicting the optimality of (#i; i).
ii) From the equilibrium property (3.8) it follows that for almost each ! 2 
 the terminal
allowance position adjustment #T (!) is a maximizer on R to
z 7!  zAT (!)  (Ei(i0 )  #i0   i(!)  z)+: (3.21)
Note that a maximizer of this mapping exists only if 0  AT (!)  . That is, the terminal
allowance price in equilibrium must be within the interval AT 2 [0; ] almost surely. Let us
show now that the price actually attains only boundary values almost surely, namely
AT 2 f0; g a:s:: (3.22)
Suppose that an intermediate AT (!) 2 (0; ) value is taken, then the unique maximizer of
the function (3.21) is attained on Ei(i0 )  #i0   i(!). This implies that #iT (!) = Ei(i0 ) 











Ei(i0 )  (!): (3.23)
Note that the equilibrium property (3.7) ensures that the random variable on the left-hand
side of the above equality is zero almost surely. Thus, we have the inclusion:
fAT 2 (0; )g  f
X
i2I
Ei(i0 )   = 0g a:s:: (3.24)
Because the probability of the event on the right-hand side of the above inclusion is zero,
(3.22) holds.
If AT (!) = 0, then a maximizer #
i
T (!) to (3.21) is attained on [E
i(i0 )  #i0   i(!);1).
Hence
fAT = 0g  fEi(i0 )  #i0   i  #iT g a:s:
for each i 2 I, which implies that
fAT = 0g  f
X
i2I
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Now, because of the equilibrium property (3.7), we obtain an almost surely inclusion
fAT = 0g  f
X
i2I
Ei(i0 )    0g a:s::
Using the dichotomy (3.22) and since the probability of the exact coincidences on the right-
hand side of (3.24) is zero, we conclude for the complementary event that
fAT = g  f
X
i2I
Ei(i0 )    0g a:s:: (3.25)
Let us show the opposite inclusion. If AT (!) = , then a maximizer #
i
T to (3.21) is attained
on ( 1; Ei(i0 )  #i0   i(!)]. Hence
fAT = g  fEi(i0 )  #i0   i  #iT g a:s:
for each i 2 I, which implies that
fAT = g  f
X
i2I




Now, because of the equilibrium property (3.7), we obtain
fAT = g  f
X
i2I
Ei(i0 )    0g a:s:: (3.26)
Finally, we combine the inclusions (3.25) and (3.26) to obtain the assertion (3.18).
x 3.2.3 Social optimality
It turns out that the equilibrium possesses natural properties, which we utilize to construct
appropriated stochastic models describing the equilibrium situations in terms of aggregated
market quantities, which we introduce next.
Given production strategies i0 2 i for i 2 I, we denote the overall market production
schedule by 0 = (
i
0)i2I and dene the total costs C, the total production volume V , and the
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To ease our analysis, let us agree on the mild technical assumption stating that the distribution
of cumulative unpredictable emissions N possesses no point masses. That is we suppose that
the certicates  = 0   N eectively available for compliance also follow a distribution
without point masses:
P( = z) = 0; for all z 2 R. (3.27)
Among all the production strategies which cover a given demand, we can prove that the
equilibrium strategy minimizes the social burden, which is given by
B() = C() + (E()  )+; for  2 :
Proposition 3 Given energy demand D0, let (A




0 ) be the equilibrium
prices with the corresponding strategies (#i; i) i 2 I. Let Q be a risk neutral measure






holds for each overall production schedule 0 = (
i
0)i2I 2 i2Ii which yields at least the same
production volume V (0)  V (0) = D0.
Proof. For each convex function f on R holds f(x) +rf(x)  h  f(x+ h) for x; h 2 R,
where rf(x) stands for one of the sub-gradients of f at the point x. In particular, for convex
function f : R! R+, x 7! x+, we obtain x+ + 1fx0gh  (x+ h)+ for all x; h 2 R. With the
equilibrium overall production strategy 0 = (
i
0 )i2I , we conclude that
(E(0)  )+ + 1fE(0) 0g[E(0)  E(0)]  [E(0)  ]+
holds almost surely for any overall production strategy 0 2 i2Ii. Calculating expectation














Using martingale property and digital terminal value of the equilibrium allowance prices,










For the case that the strategy 0 yields at least the same production volume as the equilibrium
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0)  C(0) + A0E(0)
which is equivalent to
C(0)  C(0)  A0[E(0)  E(0)]: (3.30)




  C(0) + EQ (E(0)  )+ ;
which proves our claim (3.28).
In Proposition 3, the equilibrium production schedule 0 was characterized as a solution
to the minimization problem
minfEQfB(0)g : 0 2 i2Ii; V (0)  D0g: (3.31)
Although this fact is about minimization of social burden, it should not be interpreted as one
of the classical welfare results, which typically follow from equilibrium considerations.
An interesting observation from the Proposition 3 is that the expectation EQ(B(0)) of
the social burden is minimized with respect to a risk-neutral measure Q which diers from
the objective measure P. The measure Q is an outcome of the equilibrium, and as such, it
heavily depends on the individual model ingredients, for instance on the risk aversions, on
the certicate endowments, and on the production technologies of the agents. However, it is
surprising that once the measure Q is known, other important equilibrium outcomes can be
deduced from aggregated quantities only.
Given Q, the equilibrium production schedule 0 can be obtained as the solution to
the optimization problem (3.31) which is determined by aggregated quantities, since by the
denition B(0) = C(0)+(E(0) )+ of the social burden, it depends only on technologies,
present in the market. Having obtained the equilibrium production schedule 0 as solution to




Finally, having obtained the production schedule 0 and the allowance price A

0, also the
electricity price P 0 is determined as the marginal price of the most expensive technology,
which is active in the schedule 0 . Note that the opportunity costs must be included when
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identifying the most expensive active technology.
Bottom line, given Q, merely aggregated market parameters are needed to obtain 0 , A0,
and P 0 . This observation can be used to establish and to analyze realistic equilibrium-like
emission market models. Such models are needed since in real emission trading, it is nearly
impossible to obtain an equilibrium from a market model, because all individual ingredients
are highly undetermined. For instance, within EU ETS, there are more than 25,000 agents,
each with a specic production, its own certicate endowment and completely unknown risk
aversion. On the contrary, all aggregated quantities are well-known, since high-quality mar-
ket data on total allowance allocation, electricity production including capacities, costs, and
emission rates are available.
In view of this, we suggest an equilibrium-like modeling based on aggregated quantities and
using an exogenously specied proxy for a risk neutral measure Q. This philosophy follows
the standard methodology of nancial mathematics which successfully describes the stochastic





0 ) be equilibrium allowance pric A

0, the overall equilibrium production schedule 

0






0) can be calculated, Namely, we suggest the
following approach:
Market equilibrium in terms of risk neutral measure (3.32)
0) Determine a risk neutral measure Q, which corresponds to an equilibrium situation of the
emission market in the sense of (ii) from the Proposition 2.
1) Observe that because of (3.10), the equilibrium production schedule 0 must be a solution
to the the following deterministic optimization problem
minimize C(0) + A0E(0)
subject to V (0)  D0, over 0 2 i2Ii,
(3.33)
where the parameter A0 equals to the equilibrium allowance allowance price A

0, which will
be determined in the next steps.
2) To proceed, assume that
for each A0 2 [0; ], there exists unique solution 0(A0) to (3.33) : (3.34)
Dene the following functions on possible allowance prices A0 2 [0; ]:
C(A0) = C(0(A0)); E
(A0) = E(0(A0)); A0 2 [0; ]: (3.35)
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3) Having assumed (3.34), because of (3.18), the equilibrium emission price must be a solution
to the following xed point problem
A0 = EQ(1f E(A0) 0g)
subject to A0 2 [0; ].
(3.36)
Further, suppose that
the problem (3.36) admits a unique solution A0. (3.37)




5) After calculating the equilibrium production schedule 0 = 0(A
), determine the equilibri-
um production costs C(0), the equilibrium emissions E(

0) and the equilibrium energy price
P  to assess the performance in the emission reduction of the proposed market architecture.
Note that to carry out this program, one merely needs to specify the uctuations of the
non-predictable emissions N under a risk neutral measure Q. The selection of appropriate
candidate for such measure is crucial and must be economically justied. Fortunately, being
one of the central questions in quantitative nance, the connection between risk neutral and
objective measure has been successfully addressed over recent decades. In view of this devel-
opment, a modeling from the perspective of risk-neutral measure can be based on a variety of
dierent methods, ranging from benchmark approach, estimation of risk premia, state price
density from portfolio optimization theory, to several econometric methods for the estimation
of the so-called market price of risk.
x 3.3 Numerical examples
Let us show how a realization of the program (3.32) can be carried out within a realistic
situation, where an energy market is given in terms of production capacities allocated along
diverse technologies with their specic cost structure, usually referred to as the energy mix
model .
We agree that the space of energy production technologies is described by the set [0;1)3
such that each point (c; e; v) 2 [0;1)3 represents a production technology with production
costs c (Euro per MWh), emission rate e (tonnes of CO2 per MWh) and production capacity
x 3.3. Numerical examples 33
v(MWh). We describe the energy mix, as
production capacity distribution, modeled in
terms of a density function q : [0;1)3 ! R+.
(3.38)
A selection of technologies can be represented by a set R 2 [0;1)3, which describes all
technologies (c; e; v) 2 R that are chosen for considerations. Having specied a selection
R  [0;1)3 of technologies, the totally available generation capacity, the total production
costs and the total emission from the selection R can be obtained by the integrationZ
R
v  q(c; e; v)dcdedv;
Z
R
c  q(c; e; v)dcdedv;
Z
R
e  q(c; e; v)dcdedv:
Now, let us introduce the equilibrium production which is always scheduled in the merit
order, according to the production costs. Thereby, the production costs account for the actual
emission rate, because of opportunity cost arguments. Given energy demand D0 2 [0;1), it
is clear that the range R(P0; A0) of technologies, active in energy production, is given in terms
on the energy price P and the emission price A by
R(P0; A0) = f(c; e; v) 2 [0;1)3 : c+ A0e  P0g: (3.39)
In other words, given emission price A0, the relevant costs of production technology (c; e; v)
consist of the true production costs c in addition to the opportunity costs e A0 which describe
the forgone prot from selling emission rights to the market instead of following production.
Given prices (P0; A0), each technology (c; e; v) with c+A0e  P0 participates in the production.
Thus, let us dene the volume V (P0; A0), the costs C(P0; A0), and the emission E(P0; A0) at
the prices (P0; A0) as the corresponding quantities from the production schedule R(P0; A0) by
V (P0; A0) =
Z
R(P0;A0)








e  q(c; e; v)dcdedv: (3.42)
By denition, the equilibrium production must satisfy energy demand D0 2 [0;1), thus we
dene the energy price P (D0; A0), the emission E(D0; A0), the production costs C(D0; A0),
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and the penalty payment (D0; A0) at demand D0 and emission price A0 as
P (D0; A0) = inffP0 2 [0;1[ : V (P0; A0)  D0g; (3.43)
E(D0; A0) = E(P (D0; A0); A0); (3.44)
C(D0; A0) = C(P (D0; A0); A0): (3.45)
For the penalty size  2 [0;1), we introduce the expected penalty payment at demand D0
and emission price A0 as




(E(D0; A0)  0 + n)+(n)dn; (3.47)
where we have supposed that
with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q,
the uncontrollable emission N = 0    follows a
distribution with pre-specied density  : R! R+:
9>=>; (3.48)
In the next step, the equilibrium allowance price A0(D0) at demand D0 will be determined as




1(E(D0;A0) 0+n)+(n)dn; A0 2 [0; ]:
Having obtained the equilibrium allowance price at demand D0 2 [0;1), the market per-
formance can be assessed in terms of the consumer's burden Bc(D), the producer's burden
Bp(D), and the environmental burden Be(D0), calculated at demand D0 2 [0;1). The
denitions can be given by
Bc(D0) = D0P (D0; A(D0)); (3.49)
Bp(D0) =  D0P (D0; A0(D0)) + C(D0; A(D0)) + (D0; A0(D0)); (3.50)
Be(D0) = E(D0; A0(D0)): (3.51)
We will provide a numerical study showing how the operation of a proposed emission trad-
ing scheme can be examined, given the capacity allocation of energy-generating technologies.
In our study, we illustrate a realization of the program (3.32) using the energy mix model
explained above.
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Figure 3.1: EU power capacity mix 2011.
Energy source mean cost(EURO
MWh
) emission rates ( tonneCO2
MWh
) capacity (BWh)
Fuel Oil 70 0.65 0.2
Gas 60 0.45 1.4
Coal 40 1 1.4
Table 3.1: 3 representative producers.
Having specied the penalty  = 100 (EURO unit per tonne of pollutant), we introduce
the density q : R3+ ! R+ describing the energy mix market.
q(c; e; v) = '1;21(c; e; v) + '2;22(c; e; v) + '3;23(c; e; v); (c; e; v) 2 R3+:
Table 3.1 describes a generic situation where cleaner technologies are usually more expensive.
We assume that the parameters in Table 3.1 are valid for the entire energy generation, which we
describe by choosing a relatively small standard deviation 1 = 2 = 0:02. Having introduced
the capacity density q, the functions V , C, E are dened by (3.40) { (3.42).
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x 3.3.1 Energy mix model
In what follows we illustrate our study assuming that the nominal energy demand is D0 =
2:1 = 0:7  3, which is given by 70% of the total installed capacity of 3 energy units. Further-
more, we assume that the regulator adopts a total emission cap 0 = 1:512 = 0:7 2:16 of emis-
sion units, which is also 70% of maximally possible emission of 2:16 = 0:650:2+0:451:2+11:4.
Furthermore, we specify the normal distribution '0;2 of the unpredictable demand uctuation
with  = 0:005.
For each A0 2 [0; ], we determine the unique solution to the problem (3.33), which in the





where the range R(P (D0; A0); A0) is solved by (3.39) in terms of the marginal energy price
P (D0; A0) calculated by (3.43).
According to (3.40), we introduce the emission resulting from the production plan
0(D0; A0) = E
(D0; A0):
(3.44) also gives the expected penalty payment (D0; A0) following the production plan
0(D0; A0). Furthermore, we can determine the equilibrium allowance price A
(D0) as solution
















Figure 3.2: Solution to the xed point problem (3.36).
to the xed point problem A0(D0) = 
(D0; A0). The result is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The relationship between the allowance price and the total emission is described by Figure
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Figure 3.3: Solutions to (3.36) with dierent emission levels.
3.3. There is an obvious drop of emission level when the allowance price is about 40 euros,
which implies that the emission burden will be alleviated tremendously if the allowance price
can be kept around 40 euros. Furthermore, the emission reduction will only become eective
if the allowance price is more than approximately 25 euros.
Finally, let us present the dynamic behaviors of the burdens (3.51), (3.49), and (3.50)
depending on the demand. We assume the calculations of these functions running through
the entire range [0; 2] of demand. Figure 3.4 shows a correct response of the emission trading
scheme to the proposed cap. For a wide range of the energy demand realizations, emission
market manages to trigger abatement to keep the pollution at the targeted level of 0 = 0:45.
Meanwhile, the consumers' burden increases and producers' burden decreases, as shown in
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
















Figure 3.4: Environmental burden d0 7! Be(d0) from (3.51).
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Figure 3.5: Consumers burden d0 7! Bc(d0) from (3.49).
























Figure 3.6: Producers burden d0 7! Bp(d0) from (3.50).
x 3.3.2 Extended cap-and-trade mechanisms
The principle objective of cap-and-trade system is to fulll the emission reduction target set
by Kyoto protocol commitment at a relatively low social cost. However, practical experience
from the emission trading market yields several shortcomings of this worldwide used scheme.
This section aims to ll this gap instead of directly adopting the traditional emission market.
We propose a new scheme combining the current system and the tax/subsidy policy, which has
long been deemed as a controversial policy to the emission trading system. [17] has explored
the exibility of the merit order in suggesting a generic way to change it by regulation. The
idea is simple and is originated from the observation, that a regulator can, implement in a
technology-sensitive way
i) tax/subsidy energy production in monetary units, and
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ii) tax/subsidy energy production in emission allowance units.
Such regulatory intervention has a strong eect on merit order exibility. An emission market
architecture, with tax/subsidy in monetary and pollutant units is referred to as extended
emission trading scheme. From a mathematical viewpoint, such regulation is equivalent to
a change, in a technology-sensitive way, of specic production costs and/or specic emission
rates.
Since monetary unit tax/subsidies is quite sensitive for political reasons, a numerical ex-
ample can be applied by tax/subsidies in emission allowance units. In order to achieve the
target of reducing customers' burdens, we design a mechanism that extra emission units will
be rewarded or penalized to producers according to the dierence between their emission rates
and average emission rates of all the producers. For all i 2 I,
(







enewi : mean emission after implementing tax/subsidy for producer i.
ei: mean emission before implementing tax/subsidy for producer i.
e: unit average emission for all the producers.
vi: maximum production capacity for agent i.
r: regulator rate.
Notice that the overall emission production burdens for the whole society remain the same
because of (3.52).
We should also consider that we do not expect the emission rate after introducing tax and
subsidy to be negative. Therefore, a boundary condition is required to restrict the regulator
rate. From (3.52) we know this is equivalent to





Denote r = mini2I ei(e ei)1fei<eg
and therefore 0 < r < r. In our numerical example, r = 5
3
.
If we set r = 0.5, Table 3.1 can be revalued as Table 3.2. It is worth noticing that
the pollution intensive technology coal becomes even more productive in emission after the
extended scheme is implemented. Therefore, we need lower allowance price to change the
x 3.3. Numerical examples 40
merit order which is crucial for alleviating the social burdens and windfall prots.
Energy source mean cost(EURO
MWh
) emission rates ( tonneCO2
MWh
) capacity (BWh)
Fuel Oil 70 0.615 0.2
Gas 60 0.315 1.4
Coal 40 1.140 1.4
Table 3.2: After Implementing the tax/subsidy in emission .
To discuss the possibilities to improve the performance of emission market, we need to
address the expected burdens of each market participant by setting that:
with respect to the objective measure,
the demand D0 follows a distribution
with density  : [0;1)! R+.
9>=>; (3.53)



















Notice that the energy demand D0 is bounded by [0;MC] whereMC stands for the maximum
production capacity of the whole market. A natural choice for the density of D0 is given by
the truncated normal distribution












; if a  x  b;
0; otherwise:




2) is the density function of the standard normal distribution and
() is its cumulative distribution function. Therefore, (3.54),(3.55) and (3.56) are equivalent



















Bc(d0)f(d0;; ; 0;MC) d0: (3.59)
Before the eect of the extended cap-and-trade mechanism is presented, we can evaluate
the expected emission reduction performance with respect to dierent initial allocations and
penalties. Notice that there are at least two controls available to the regulator: the total
allowance allocation 0 and the penalty size . The performance of a cap-and-trade scheme
can be assessed in terms of a relation between emission saving versus its costs. Such analysis
may uncover an inappropriate market architecture, where by an unlucky choice of parameter
0 and/or  causes consumers to pay too much, compared to what is achieved. Unfortunately,
such situation can arise when the merit order of technologies is not exible enough, meaning
that it cannot change in response to the emission price. For instance, if we design the the
initial allocation 0 = (0:6; 0:633;    ; 0:9) and the penalty price  = (10; 25;    ; 145), the
expected environmental burden is shown by Figure 3.7 with average energy demand to be
(0:6; 0:633;    ; 0:9)MC and standard deviation to be 0:1MC. This gure partially explains
the mal-function of today's emission schemes. For example, when 0 = 0:6, the penalty price
of 40 euros is sucient to mitigate the environmental burdens to a large extent. However,
when the free allocation 0 approaches 90%, even 100 euros penalty changes very little about
the environmental burden. Therefore, it is urgent to redeem excess free allocation to reactivate
the emission market. Furthermore, this gure reveals that EU ETS has applied inappropriate
measures to solve the low allowance price problem because the initial allocation is much
more important than the penalty price in terms of the emission reduction and therefore the
allowance price as well.
To see the eect of the extended cap-and-trade mechanism, we set (; ) = (0:75; 0:1)MC
for the truncated normal distribution and compare expected burdens from equations (3.57),
(3.58) and (3.59) by table 3.3, which presents the data before and after introducing the
tax/subsidy scheme.
This is a very promising improvement since the customers' burden and producers' prots
are reduced by 11:8% and 33:62% respectively while the environmental burden changes very
little. It is also clear evidence to prove that the tax/subsidy policy can strongly alleviate the



























Figure 3.7: Environmental burden with dierent gama0 and penalty.
social burdens as well as the windfall prots, which is a negative externality of the emission
trading scheme.
To see the eect of regulator r, we set the regulator to run over the interval [0; r]. Observed
from Figure 3.8, the producers' prots decreasing speed is much faster than that of customers'
and environmental burdens. This means social cost performs better than the windfall prots
in terms of the burden relief eciency.
tax/subsidy Consumers' burden producers' prots environmental burden
before 174.4 61.4 1.616
after(r=0.5) 153.8 40.7 1.615
improvement 11.8% 33.62 % 0.08%
Table 3.3: Corresponding burdens before and after tax/subsidy.























Figure 3.8: Burden improvement in percentage.
x 3.3.3 An application in Chinese market
Before ETS was established in China, the concept of carbon emission trading was introduced
in China by CDM. Chinese government began to attend CDM program actively at the year
of 2004. By 2008, CER from CDM program in China had exceeded half of the total global
amount. Furthermore, several emission trading exchanges were founded at the same year.
Chinese government was determined to reduce the carbon emission by 40% to 50% at the
year of 2020 compared to 2005's level. At the end of 2013, seven cities and provinces had
established the local emission trading schemes and a national system was planned to set up
by 2015. It is a great relief for the global climate change because the participant of Chinese
government into the emission trading scheme. China became the number one carbon emission
producer in 2011 and therefore there are plenty of opportunities in Chinese emission market
now. For instance, in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, three leading economic cities in China,
the statistical data shows that there are more than 3 millon tons of emission trading, account
for more than 200 million yuan of transactions in less than half a year.
The success or failure of those pilot cities and provinces will to a great extent determines
the future of climate policies in China. While the attempts to develop a domestic carbon
trading are sincere and ambitious, there are numerous diculties. Many of the challenges are
not particular to China, but common to any emission trading systems. However, there are
also more pressing worries about how to operate a market-based instrument given the current
shortcomings of the Chinese market system in general.( see [37] for details). Observed from
Figure 3.9, allowance price dynamic in Beijing is almost a right shift of that in Shenzhen, which
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leaves an obvious arbitrage opportunity if the allowance could be traded domestically. There-
fore, lots of regulatory policies need to be optimized when Chinese government establishes a
national scheme in the near future.
In this section, we just use our model to evaluate the setting of penalty price in Chinese
market because the apparent dierence between Chinese and EU ETS is that the penalty
price in EU is xed at 100 euros while in China most of the local schemes set it to be three
times of the average spot prices. Our target is to evaluate the eectiveness and eciency of
this penalty setting in Chinese market for regulators.
In addition, this is actually a path dependent question if we introduce the penalty price
as the mean allowance to our model. We currently do not consider this much more dicult
mathematical problem and set the penalty to be constant instead. Even more, for the more
complex problems like the futures and options price, we leave them to the continuous model
in Chapter 5 to solve.
















Figure 3.9: Spot price in three cities .
The emission trading scheme in all the seven cities and provinces opened on January 16
2014 and there were around 120 spot prices revealed in the market. To apply the energy mix
model, we also need to know the energy structure of Chinese electricity market. Observed
from Figure 3.10 that the majority resource in Chinese energy industry is Coal and the portion
of gas, which is more environmentally friendly, is negligible. Therefore, it is urgent for Chinese
government to nd an appropriate policy to motivate the market participants to change the
energy structure.
The mean value of the three technologies model here is given by Table 3.4 and we need
x 3.3. Numerical examples 45
 




Figure 3.10: Energy mix in China in 2011 .
to mention that the currency is still denoted by euros for computational convenience. We
apply our model to the market burdens of equations (3.11) and (3.12). It is interesting to
nd that the ideal penalty price in Chinese market is around 60 euros, namely about 500
yuan. However, from the existing data, we know that the average spot prices in Beijing and
Shenzhen are around 58 yuan and in Shanghai is only 23 yuan. Therefore according to the
three time penalty criterion, the maximum possible value should be less than 200 yuan, which
is only 40% of the most eciency setting. This theoretical and practical gap is mainly because
Chinese energy market is too reliable on environmental harmful resource like coal hence the
market participants must get used to the new policy gradually.
Energy source mean cost(EURO
MWh
) emission rates ( tonneCO2
MWh
) capacity (BWh)
Fuel Oil 52 0.65 0.6
Gas 45 0.45 0.1
Coal 30 1 2.3
Table 3.4: After tax/subsidy in emission.
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Figure 3.11: Consumers' burden with dierent penalty price .
























Figure 3.12: Environmental burden with dierent penalty price .
x 3.4 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates a novel idea of the emission trading system, namely stop the
argument between emission trading and tax/subsidy by combining them eciently. The
main result is that by moderately levying tax and giving subsidy, the windfall prots of the
producers, which have been long criticized by the opponents of emission trading, will be
reduced tremendously while no harmful eect will be exerted on the environment.
Our model is simple because of the one period assumption and all the mathematical
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problems can be reduced to a xed point equation. However, the numerical result shows that
this model is sucient to provide some reliable explanations and suggestions of current EU
ETS. This is important since a good model must explain the empirical phenomena and be
computationally feasible at the same time.
In addition, our model can also be applied to the newly founded but very promising Chinese
emission market. The numerical result suggests that Chinese government needs to increase
the penalty price gradually to change their energy structure from coal dominated to a more
environmentally friendly one.
Chapter 4
Multi-period model of emission
market optimization
In this chapter, we provide a multi-period setting with risk averse market participants. This
model is an extension of the single period energy model. However, the extension signicantly
upgrades all existing theories and numerical applications in this eld because the mathematical
foundation is a high dimensional optimal control problem instead of the xed point equation.
Based on our model, we show how the optimization market design can be used to reach the
emission reduction commitment at low social costs. In addition, we will check whether the
extended cap-and-trade mechanism works under the multi-period setting as well.
x 4.1 Introduction
EU ETS has reached the third phase, targeting at reducing 20% of the carbon emission
compared to 1990's level. Several measures have been adopted to achieve this goal. For
example, grandfathering, which has long been recognized as the main problem of this market,
has nally been strongly reduced, especially in the electricity generation industry.
However, there is still a long way to achieve the main objective of EU ETS: reduce the
greenhouse gases to a healthy level by a sustainable and economic way. Recently, several
measures are proposed by a document of the European Commission:
- introduce a discretionary price management mechanism.
- extend the scope of EU ETS to other sectors.
- retire a number of allowances in phase three.
48
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These measures seem to avoid the main problem on purpose because they lack the long
term methods to allocate the emission certicates, which are denitely more pressing than
the current acts.
Because of the extremely low allowance price, people begin to question the function ability
of EU ETS and even start to challenge the necessity for this scheme to survive. However, before
this extreme scenario happens, it is urgent for us to obtain a comprehensive understanding of
EU ETS and to provide a applicable method to help the regulators.
After the famous deterministic equilibrium model [11], other researchers have taken the
direction to stochastic and multi-period settings. A consensus result is that the cap-and-trade
system represents the most ecient method to abate the carbon emission at low social costs.
We will mention several equilibrium models that are related to our model:[25], [20], [16], [17],
[31], [32], [19], in which the risk neutral agents optimize the expected prot from emission
market. Then non-risk aversion or single period settings will signicantly simplify the proof
of the eciency in emission market.
A comprehensive and eective analysis of the optimization design for emission market
attributes to [17]. Their paper demonstrates that a traditional architecture of the emission
market is far from optimal because of the tremendous windfall prots. Furthermore, they
propose a theoretical but not practical method to handle this problem. Such improvements
can be achieved by exercising additional controls which are available to the regulators. In
traditional scheme, the regulatory agency can set two controls. One of them is the cap which
means that the regulator has the authority to distribute the allowance. The other one is the
penalty, which is levied on the pollution oenders. However, the exibility of this market is
limited because the cap is mostly aected by political factors and the setting of penalty can
change very little of the situation. As a result, the traditional emission market can perform
very poor in emission reduction considering the huge social cost.
In the extended scheme, the inuence of the regulatory agency is much stronger. They can
tax or subsidy the polluter in terms of monetary unit or emission unit. This additional control
can be utilized by the technology-sensitive method. Therefore, the emission savings can be
guaranteed to a certain level. [17] demonstrates that the re-allocation of the initial allowance
in the multi-period setting can achieve the emission abatement target at much lower social
costs. Although the theoretical foundation of their paper is solid, the application of market
design is not available. In this chapter, we assume the market agents obtain non-linear utility
and we show several properties of the market equilibrium which makes the optimization of
the market design possible. Numerically, the Least-square Monte Carlo method is applied to
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solve the conditional expectation problem. Furthermore, the theory is brought in line with the
state-of-the-art in economic modeling. This chapter is organized as follows. At the beginning,
we introduce and study our equilibrium model. Furthermore, we prove its properties and give
an outlook on market design optimization in the risk averse setting. Last, we provide the
numerical applications to several critique problems in emission market.
x 4.2 Mathematical models
x 4.2.1 Equilibrium model of emission market
In an emission market, a nite number of agents, specied by set I, are required to meet the
emission reduction target within their productions at discrete times t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Tg  N .
The key assumptions are:
 The time horizon for the emission market is [0; T ], within which the banking and bor-
rowing are not considered in our current model.
 Agents can apply production and trading carbon allowances at a discrete time
t 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Tg  N . And all prices, strategies are considered as adapted stochastic
processes in a ltered probability space (
;F ; P; (Ft)Tt=0), so the decisions of all market
participants are based on the information ow given by the ltration (Ft)Tt=0.
 The interest rate is zero for computational convenience.
Although the parameter settings are similar to last chapter, we still need to clarify them
for the future usage. In emission market, at time t, each producer is confronted with the
decision of his production plan within the period [t; t+1). We denote the production plan by
it and the corresponding feasible production strategy space is presented as 
i
t for each agent
i at time t.






t ! [0;1); it(!) 7! V it (it(!)); C it(it(!)); Eit(it(!)) ;
with the interpretation that for production plan it 2 it and ! 2 







t(!)) stand for the produced volume, total production costs, and total
carbon dioxide emission respectively. We shall omit ! from the notations for the rest of this
chapter.
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Assumption: We assume that the cost and emission function Cit , E
i
t are strictly increasing,
convex and dierentiable while the volume function V it is strictly increasing, concave and
dierentiable. This assumption corresponds with the fact that the marginal cost and marginal
emission are increasing while the marginal production volume is decreasing. In addition, the
dierentiation assumption is stronger than the convex and concave settings. Whether we can
loosen this assumption leaves to future studies.
Production requirement: At time t, t = 0; 1;    ; T   1, with the energy demand Dt 2 Ft
of the entire market, the realized electricity price Pt 2 Ft, each agent i 2 I determines its
production plan it 2 it such that the accumulated production costs at the compliance time














Allowance trading: We denote At as the futures price at time t with delivery of one
allowance at maturity time T . At times t = 0; 1;    ; T   1 the allowance permits can be






t=0 are the change of the
allowance number held by agent i 2 I at times t = 0; 1;    ; T   1. At the terminal time T ,
each agent can still trade one more time of the allowance number #iT at price AT in order to







(it   it 1)At =
T 1X
t=0
t(At+1   At)  TAT ; (4.3)
where t denotes the total allowance number held by agent i by time t and 
i
 1 = 0.
Allowance allocation: The policy makers will distribute a pre-determined allowance num-
ber to each producer i 2 I. Since the emission number of each agent is random, the allowances
i eectively available for compliance are calculated by withdrawing unpredictable emissions
from the initial allocation. The available allowance amount is therefore modeled by a ran-
dom variable. Furthermore, the accumulated allowance number for the whole society at the
compliance time is also random. Another assumption, which is natural and convenient for
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computations, holds that the distribution of  possess no point mass.
P( = z) = 0; for all z 2 R. (4.4)
Emission from production: Following the production plan (it)
T 1
t=0 , the total pollution of






Penalty payment: The penalty  2 [0;1) is dened by the payment at the maturity time





t=0 and the allowance 
i allocated to producer i initially, the total penalty payment














t)  T   i)+: (4.6)
Prot/lost: Based on (4.3) | (4.6), the prot or lost for agent i is demonstrated by
























#it   i)+: (4.7)




t=0 ), the corresponding trading and







Energy demand: Since the demand in energy industry is often determined one day ahead
and the uctuation of demand is relatively small, we can assume that the energy demand is
xed at the beginning of each period. Furthermore, the energy demand must be covered by
the accumulated productions of the market participants.
Risk aversion: Suppose the risk preference of each producer is determined by a utility
function U i : R ! R which is strictly increasing, concave and dierentiable. Therefore,
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producer i 2 I is targeted at the maximization of the function
(#i; i) 7! E(U i(LA;P;i(#i; i)))







Market equilibrium: Based on previous descriptions, it is natural to propose the denition
of equilibrium, which is an ideal condition for the nancial market. In an equilibrium, the
allowance price and electricity price must satisfy that each agent fullls his own objective
while the natural restrictions are committed.
Denition 5 Given energy demand (Dt)
T 1
t=0 where Dt 2 Ft is known at the very beginning






t=0 ) is called the equilibrium price, if for
each agent i 2 I, there exists a strategy (#i; i) = ((#it )Tt=0; (it )T 1t=0 ) such that:




t ) = Dt; t = 0; 1;    ; T   1;
(ii) the emission certicates are in zero net supplyX
i2I
#it = 0; t = 0; 1;    ; T; (4.8)
(iii) each agent i 2 I is optimized by his own policy in the sense that
E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i)))  E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i))) (4.9)





t)  Dt for all t = 0; 1;    ; T   1.
According to the description of opportunity cost and merit order introduced in Chapter
3, we have the following denitions.
Denition 6 Consider a given energy amount d 2 R+ and allowance price a 2 R+.
i) Introduce the individual opportunity merit order costs of the agent i 2 I at time t as
Cit(d; a) = inff(Cit(it) + aEit(it)) : it 2 it; V it (it)  dg:
x 4.2. Mathematical models 54
An individual production plan it 2 it is said to conform with opportunity costs at emission
price a 2 R+ if it holds that
Cit(V it (it ); a) = C it(it ) + aEit(it ): (4.10)
ii) Introduce the cumulative opportunity merit order costs as

















The production plan it 2 it, i 2 I is said to conform with opportunity costs at emission price



















iii) Any price p 2 R+ with the property that
 Ct( ~d; a) + p ~d   Ct(d; a) + pd; for all ~d 2 R+
is referred to as an opportunity merit order electricity price at (d; a).
x 4.2.2 Properties of equilibrium
Before proving the existence of the equilibrium, we need to specify that the optimal production
plan can t the opportunity cost. Furthermore, the equilibrium electricity price conforms with
the merit order price.
Proposition 4 Given energy demand (Dt)
T 1
t=0 where Dt 2 Ft is known at the beginning of






t=0 ) be the equilibrium prices with
the corresponding strategies (#i; i) = ((#i)Tt=0; (
i)T 1t=0 ) for i 2 I, then we can reach the
following conclusions.
i) The production plan it at time t for agent i 2 I conforms with the opportunity costs at the
emission price At such that
Cit(V it (it ); At ) = C it(it ) + AtEit(it ) a:s:: (4.11)
ii) Furthermore, the production plan it at time t for agent i 2 I, also conforms with oppor-
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t )) a:s:: (4.12)















t=0 ) for agent i 2 I
is given, we can assume that the agent, instead of following the optimal strategy, adopts a









s except for s = t. In order to keep the zero net
condition of the optimality, the trading dierence Eit(
i
t)   Eit(it ) must be added into #it .
Therefore the equilibrium trading strategy ((#it )
T










t)  Eit(it ); #is = #is ; s 6= t:
A direct calculation reveals that the prot or lost of this alternative strategy (#i; i) diers by
LA
;P ;i(#i; i) = LA












t)  V it (it )] + [C it(it )  Cit(it)] + At [Eit(it )  Eit(it)]:




it ! 2 
=M;
this yields a contradiction
E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; ei))) > E(U i(LA;P ;i(#i; i)))
to the individual optimality (4.9) of the equilibrium strategy (#i; i). Therefore R(it; 
i
t )  0
a.s., which is equivalent to
  C it(it )  AtEit(it ) + P t V it (it )   C it(it)  AtEit(it) + P t V it (it) a:s:; (4.14)
for each it 2 it. Therefore, the desired conclusion (4.36) comes as follows: any alternative













t ) + A

tE










t ) = inffCit(it) + AtEit(it) : it 2 it; V it (it)  V it (it )g a:s::



















































t ) = Dt a:s:;


























which directly proves the expected assertion (4.12).
iii) It suces to prove that, for any ~d 2 R+,
























































t)  ~d; for t = 0; 1;    ; T   1 a:s:; (4.15)






























+ P t ~d:
Passing on the right-hand side of this inequality to


































t )   Ct( ~d;At ) + P t ~d:
Based on this proposition, we can show the no-arbitrage property for the allowance trading,
which is fundamental for a fair nancial market. Furthermore, the terminal allowance price
is digital because of the specic setting of the cap-and-trade system.
Proposition 5 Given energy demand (Dt)
T 1
t=0 where Dt 2 Ft is known at the beginning of






t=0 ) be the equilibrium prices where the
optimal strategies are given by (#i; i) i 2 I, then we can derive the following result.
i) There exists a risk-neutral measure Q  P such that A = (At )Tt=0 is a martingale with
respect to Q.
ii) The terminal equilibrium allowance price is digital
AT = 1fPi2IPT 1t=0 Eit(it ) 0g: (4.16)
Proof. i) According to the rst fundamental theorem of asset pricing [36], there is an equiv-
alence between the absence of arbitrage, which is in turn implied by the equilibrium and the




Therefore, it suces to verify that the equilibrium exterminate all arbitrage opportunities for
allowance trading. If, on the contrary, suppose that (t)
T 1
t=0 is an allowance trading arbitrage,
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T   At ) > 0) > 0; (4.17)
consider an alternative strategy
~#it := #
i




















T   At ):
Combine this result with (4.17),we attain that
P





LA;i(#i; i) < LA;i(~#i; i)

> 0:
Based on this, we obtain a contradiction by showing that each agent i can change the policy














therefore contradicting the optimality of (#i; i).
























t)  iT   i)+
and the current strategy is optimal, the accumulated futures contracts plus the terminal
allowance position adjustment T (!) is a maximizer on R almost surely to
z 7!  zAT   (
T 1X
t=0
Ei(it )  i   z)+: (4.18)
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It is natural to conjecture that the equilibrium allowance price must be within the interval
AT 2 [0; ] almost surely, which is intuitively that the allowance price must be positive and
below the penalty price simultaneously. Furthermore, we can prove that the allowance can
only take the boundary values almost surely:
AT 2 f0; g a:s:: (4.19)
Suppose there exists a set e
 with positive measure such that for any ! 2 e
, AT (!) 2 (0; ),
























t )  (!): (4.20)
The zero net property (4.8) implies that the left hand side is 0 almost surely. Therefore, the
inclusion holds







t )   = 0g a.s.. (4.21)
The no point mass property (4.4) also ensures that the probability of the event on the right-
hand side of the above inclusion is zero, which proves (4.19).
On the other hand, ifAT (!) = 0, a maximizer 
i













t )  i  iT g a.s. for each i 2 I:
Again the zero net supply implies that







t )    0g a.s.. (4.22)
Similarly, for AT (!) = , we can also deduce that





Ei(it )    0g a.s.. (4.23)
Therefore, combining the inclusions (4.22) and (4.23) gives us the nal conclusion (4.16).
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x 4.2.3 Social optimality
Given the production strategies i = (it)
T 1
t=0 2 i = (it)T 1t=0 for i 2 I, we introduce the
overall costs C, the overall emission E, the total production volume V at time t, and the





















Notice that C() represents the social costs of the production and (E()   )+ stands for




P t Vt(t)  C()  (E()  )+
expresses the social prots caused by the overall production plan  2 i2Ii.
Given the social utility function U : R ! R, the social optimality problem is to nd
 2  such that
 = arg sup
2
EfU(B())g: (4.24)
Before we prove the existence of the social optimality, we show that B() is optimized with
respect to the risk neutral measure Q if we assume the existence of the equilibrium allowance
price (A; P ) with corresponding production strategy . The risk neutral measure under
which (At )
T
t=0 are martingales is given by Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 Given energy demand (Dt)
T 1
t=0 where Dt 2 Ft is known at the beginning of






t=0 ) be the equilibrium price with the
corresponding strategy (#i; i) and Q be a risk neutral measure whose existence is proved in
Proposition 5, then
EQfB()g  EQfB()g (4.25)
holds for all the production plans  = (i)i2I 2 i2Ii in which the output is at least the same
as the production volume Vt(t)  Vt(t ) = Dt a.s. for all the agents at time t.
Proof. It is natural to derive from the basic convex analysis that for a convex function f on
R, we have f(x)+rf(x) h  f(x+h) for x; h 2 R, where rf(x) represents the sub-gradients
of f at the point x. Specically, for f : R! R+, x 7! x+, which is clearly a convex function
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by denition, we obtain x+ + 1fx0gh  (x+ h)+ for all x; h 2 R with the equilibrium overall
production strategy  = (i)i2I . Therefore the inequality holds that
(E()  )+ + 1fE() 0g(E()  E())  (E()  )+ a.s.
for any production plan  2 i2Ii. Equivalently,
EQ

(E()  )+	+ EQfAT [E()  E()]g  EQ (E()  )+	 : (4.26)
According to Proposition 4 (ii), for each t = 0; 1;    ; T   1,
P t Vt(t)  Ct(t)  AtEt(t)  P t Vt(t )  Ct(t )  AtEt(t ) a.s..
Calculating the expectation with respect to Q on both hand side, we obtain
EQfP t Vt(t)  Ct(t)  AtEt(t)g  EQ
fP t Vt(t )  Ct(t )  AtEt(t )g: (4.27)










t )  C()  ATE()g: (4.28)













t )  C()  (E()  )+
)
:
In Proposition 6, the equilibrium production plan  reduces to a solution of the mini-
mization problem
minfEQfB()g :  2 i2Ii; Vt(t)  Dt for all t = 0; 1;    ; T   1g: (4.29)
An interesting phenomenon is that the optimal control problem in application may not
result in the cheapest way to commit the emission reduction. Numerous evidence have shown
that the so called \Windfall" prot exists substantially in the cap-and-trade system, which
is far from optimal even appropriately designed. However, theoretically we can prove the
optimal control problem (4.24) exists.
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Proposition 7 Suppose the admissible production strategies are give by
i : = f(it)T 1t=0 : adapted and bounded value processg;
 : = i2Ii; D := f 2 ; Vt(t)  Dt for all t = 0; 1;    ; T   1g;
where Dt 2 Ft is the energy demand known at the beginning of the time period [t; t + 1) for
all the agents. Then there exists a solution  2 D to the global optimal control problem
 = arg sup
2D
EfU(B())g; (4.30)
given the utility function U is strictly increasing, convex and dierentiable.
Proof. First, we introduce following spaces of adapted processes:
L1 := f(it)i2It2[0;T 1] : it 2 L1(Ft); t = 0; 1;    ; T   1; i 2 Ig;
L1 := f(it)i2It2[0;T 1] : it 2 L1(Ft); t = 0; 1;    ; T   1; i 2 Ig:

















t g;  2 L1; 
0 2 L1: (4.31)
Consider the weak topology [38] (L1;L1) on L1 , namely the weakest topology for which
all the linear forms
L1 ! R;  !< ; 0 >; 0 2 L1
are continuous. We claim that the real valued function
 ! EfU(B())g
is upper semi-continuous for the weak topology.
For xed e 2 D, since Cit and Eit are convex for each t = 0; 1;    ; T   1 and i 2 I, we
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obtain





EfU 0(B())[P t V
0i
t (
eit)  C 0it (eit)  1fE(e) 0gE 0it (eit)](it   eit)g: (4.32)






eit)  C 0it (eit)  1fE(e) 0gE 0it (eit)] 2 L1(Ft)
for all t = 0; 1;    ; T 1 and i 2 I since U 0 ,C 0it and E 0it are increasing and bounded. Therefore
(4.32) follows the form of (4.31) which leads us to the conclusion that EfU(B())g is upper
semi-continuous for the weak topology. Furthermore, we claim that D is weakly compact
by lemma 1 provided that D is convex since  is convex and V
i
t is a concave function for all
t = 0; 1;    ; T   1 and i 2 I. Therefore D is weakly compact because D is bounded and
the result of Lemma 1. According to Banach-Alaogu theorem [39], a upper semi-continuous
function attains its maximum on a compact set in a Banach space, therefore our proof is
completed.
Lemma 1 For the convex subset D of L1 it holds that
i) D is norm-closed in L1;
ii) D is (L1;L1)-closed in L1:
Proof. (i) Suppose (n)n2N is a sequence in D converging in L1 to some random variable
, then there exists subsequence of f(n)itgn2N converging in mean for each t 2 [0; T   1] and
i 2 I. We still denote the subsequence by f(n)itgn2N without loss of generality. It concludes






tgn2N converge respectively and therefore  2  for
the constrains in D is satised in limit.
(ii) Since D is a convex and norm-closed subset of L1, it follows from the Hahn-Banach
theorem that D is the intersection of half spaces H;c = fX 2 L1j < X;  > cg with
 2 L1 and c 2 R. We conclude that H;c
TL1 = fX 2 L1j < ;X > cg is closed
in (L1; (L1;L1)) because L1 2 L1. On the other hand, D 2 L1 by the denition of
production plan. The result of (ii) follows from the result that L1 is composed by the
intersection of the sets H;c
TL1 which are (L1;L1)-closed.
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x 4.2.4 Existence of equilibrium
Follow the above discussions, the existence of the equilibrium prices is not easy to attain due
to the uncertainty of multiple time settings. In order to accomplish this target, we follow
the steps based on the existence of the social optimality. First, we claim that the optimal
production strategy it conforms with the opportunity cost production at properly dened
emission prices (At )
T
t=0 for each agent i 2 I at time t. Second, based on step 1, the emission
prices dened in step 1 is actually the equilibrium prices provided with the well dened
production price P . Furthermore, the optimal strategy is given by (#i; i); i 2 I with some
chosen trading strategy (#i); i 2 I. We can dene the overall production cost and emission













Proposition 8 Suppose  2 D is a solution to the social optimality, existence of which is















EfU 0(B())g ; (4.34)
then we have the following conclusions.
i) t = (
i
t )i2I at time t, i 2 I, conforms with opportunity costs at the emission price At
Ct(Vt(t); At ) = Ct(t) + AtEt(t) a.s.. (4.35)
ii) For each agent i 2 I, at time t, the individual production plan it at time t conforms with
the opportunity costs at the emission price At :
Cit(V it (it ); At ) = Cit(it ) + AtEit(it ) a.s.. (4.36)
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Proof. We need to show that Ct(t) + A

tEt(t)  Ct(t ) + AtEt(t ) a.s. provided Vt(t) 
Vt(

t ). It suces to prove that
P t Vt(

t )  Ct(t )  AtEt(t )  P t Vt(t)  Ct(t)  AtEt(t): (4.37)
We rst claim that for any  2 , we have the inequality
EfU(B())jFtg  EfU(B())jFtg a:s:: (4.38)
If (4.38) is not true, the Ft - measurable set
M := fEfU(B())jFtg < EfU(B())jFtg
would be of positive measure such that P(M) > 0. We set eis = 1Mis + 1
=Mis for all
s = 0; 1;    ; T   1 and i 2 I. Notice that eis is an adapted process satisfying eis 2 is by its
denition. This setting is actually a better global strategy than .





Therefore  is also a solution to the optimal problem:
 = arg sup
2D
EfU(B())jFtg:
Getting partial derivative with respect to t, we obtain






































t ) = 0 a:s:: (4.39)
Therefore the concavity of Vt and convexity of Ct and Et can lead us to the conclusion that
fP t Vt(t)  Ct(t)  AtEt(t)g   fP t Vt(t )  Ct(t )  AtEt(t )g












t )g(   ) = 0;
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which proves (4.37).




t , s 6= i, we can easily reach the result
of (4.36). It is natural to conjecture from equation (4.39) that the equilibrium prices exist
















a:s:; for t = 0; 1;    ; T   1: (4.40)
The meaning of (4.40) is clear that the electricity price is the marginal production cost plus
the marginal emission cost.
Proposition 9 With the assumptions of Proposition 8, (A; P ) dened by (4.33) and (4.40)


















Proof. According to the denition of L,
LA
;P ;i(i; i) = LA








































t )  i   E(
) 
jIj . Denote
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t)  Cit(it)  ATEit(it)]  ATi:
It suces to nd i 2 A, and i 2 i such that
EfU(eLA;P ;i(i; i))g = sup
i2A;ii
EfU(XiT + Y 
i
T )g; (4.42)
where A is the admissible trading strategies for (it)T 1t=0 . We claim that
sup
i2A;ii
EfU(XiT + Y 
i





For xed production plan i 2 i, the unconstrained maximum problem is equivalent to a
constrained problem (
supi2A EfU(XiT + Y 
i
T )g;
s:t: EQ(XiT ) = 0:
The Lagrange function is given by
L(i; 
i
) = EfU(XiT + Y 
i







depending on i is the Lagrangian multiplier. Furthermore, the partial maximization
with respect to it can be performed by





)(At+1   At )g = 0: (4.44)











Obtaining the expectation with respect to Q on both hand sides, we know
EQ(Y 
i
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According to (4.45), the original problem (4.42) is equivalent to
sup
i2




Since U  (U 0) 1 is decreasing by the denition of the utility function and the density holds
dQ








) 1 is also decreasing, we arrive at our claim (4.43) by combining (4.46) and






Therefore, one possible strategy for the optimality of (it)
T 1
t=0 is that 
i
t = 0 for all t =
0; 1;    ; T   1. In order to complete our proof, it suces to show that
T 1X
t=0




EQfP t V it (it )  C it(it )  AtEit(it )g a:s:: (4.49)
Notice that (4.49) means the social optimal strategy is also the best choice for producers who





t)  C it(it)  AtEit(it)  P t V it (it )  Cit(it )  AtEit(it ):
Summing over this inequality in t = 0; 1;   T   1 and taking expectation with respect to
risk-neutral measure Q, we reach our conclusion.
Proposition 9 means the global optimal strategy for social burden and the optimal pro-
duction strategy for individual under equilibrium prices coincide.
x 4.3 Numerical examples
It is well known that Monte Carlo method is not ecient to calculate the path dependent
options and therefore the Least-square algorithm is provided to overcome this diculty. First
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carried out by [40] and is made popular a few years later by [41], the key to their approach is
the use of the Least-square to estimate the conditional expectation payo to the option holders
from continuation because the early exercise option problem is fundamentally a simulation
to the conditional expectation. Furthermore, their method can be readily applicable in path-
dependent and multi-factor situations where traditional nite dierence and binomial tree
techniques cannot function eciently. Therefore, the Least-square Monte Carlo method is
ideal for our model calibration because the solution to the allowance price is essentially solving
martingale problems involving conditional expectations.
With risk neutral measure given by (4.34), the equilibrium price can be derived from the




Such risk-neutral equilibrium-like modeling requires a specication of few aggregated quan-
tities only: the total allowance allocation , the total production costs t 7! C(t), the total
emission t ! E(t) and total production volume t ! V (t) depending on the overall market
production t at each time t. Furthermore, a candidate Q for risk neutral measure must
be determined. Thereby, one merely needs to specify the uctuations of the non-predictable
emissions under a risk neutral measure. This distribution should be described in a parameter-
dependent way, which adds a exibility to the model.
Fortunately, being one of the central questions in quantitative nance, the connection be-
tween risk neutral and objective measure has been successfully addressed over recent decades.
In view of this development, a modeling from the perspective of risk-neutral measure can be
based on a variety of dierent methods, ranging from benchmark approach, estimation of risk
premia, state price density from portfolio optimization theory, to several econometric methods
for the estimation of the so-called market price of risk.
Having determined a realistic candidate for Q, the solution  to the minimization prob-
lem (4.50) determines the prices A and P . Note that , A and P  will depend on free
parameters in the distribution of  under Q. At this point, the model can be calibrated, by
selecting those parameters which yield a realistic market price A for emission certicates.
Finally, the performance of the cap and trade mechanism can be examined. A discussion
can be based on a numerical dependence analysis of how controls are available to the regulator
inuence, the consumer's costs P t Dt, the producer's costs Ct(

t ), and the total emission Et(

t )
at time t. More importantly, we should check whether the extended cap-and-trade system
will be implemented well under the multi-period settings.
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x 4.3.1 Energy mix application
An energy mix model realizes the allowance pricing within a realistic situation, where pro-
duction capacities allocated along diverse technologies with their specic cost and emission
structure are given.
The parameter settings are similar to the the single period model. However we should
reintroduce them briey to avoid confusions.
The space of energy production technologies can be described by the set [0;1)3 such that
each point (c; e; v) 2 [0;1)3 represents a production technology with production costs c (euros
per MWh), emission rate e (tonnes of CO2 per MWh) and production volume v (MWhs). We
describe the energy mix, as
production capacity distribution, modeled in
terms of a density function q : [0;1)3 ! R+.
(4.51)
A selection of technologies can be represented by a setR 2 [0;1)3 which describes all technolo-
gies (c; e; v) 2 R. Provided with a selection R  [0;1)3 of technologies, the total production
costs, the total emission and the totally available production capacity from the selection R
can be obtained by the integrationsZ
R
c  q(c; e; v)dcdedv;
Z
R
e  q(c; e; v)dcdedv;
Z
R
v  q(c; e; v)dcdedv:
Now, let us introduce the equilibrium production which is always scheduled in the merit
order, according to the production costs. We know from (4.40) that the electricity price is
the marginal production cost plus the marginal emission cost, therefore the range R(Pt; At)
of technologies, active in energy production, is given in terms of the energy price P and the
emission price A by
R(Pt; At) = f(c; e; v) 2 [0;1)3 : c+ Ate  Ptg: (4.52)
In other words, given emission price At, the relevant costs of production technology (c; e; v)
consists of the true production costs c in addition to the opportunity costs e  At which
represents the forgone prot from selling emission rights to the market instead of following
production. Given prices (Pt; At), each technology (c; e) with c+Ate  Pt participates in the
production. Thus, let us dene the volume V (Pt; At), the costs C(Pt; At) and the emission
E(Pt; At) at the prices (Pt; At) as the corresponding quantities from the production schedule













e  q(c; e; v)dcdedv: (4.55)
By denition, the equilibrium production must satisfy energy demand Dt 2 [0;1), thus we
dene the energy price P t (Dt; At), the emission E
(Dt; At), the production costs C(Dt; At),
and the penalty payment ((Dt)T 1t=0 ; (At)
T 1
t=0 ) at demand Dt and emission price At as
P t (Dt; At) = inffPt 2 [0;1[ : V (Pt; At)  Dtg; (4.56)
Et (Dt; At) = E(P
(Dt; At); At); (4.57)
Ct (Dt; At) = C(P
(Dt; At); At): (4.58)
Dene St =
Pt 1
s=0fEs(Ds; As)  sg as the allowance shortage by time t, then the equilibrium




t ) at demand
Dt and allowance shortage S

t can be determined as a solution to the xed point problem
At (Dt; S

t ) = EQfAt+1(Dt+1; St + Et (Dt ; At )  t)jFtg
for given Dt and Dt+1. Since t is Ft measurable, an one-dimensional Least-square Monte
Carlo method can be applied. A more detailed description of the Least-square Monte Carlo
method can be found in [41] and [42].
On the computational aspects, it is clearly that At (S

t ) is a (S

t ) measurable random
variable, thus the x point equation can be replaced by
At (S

t ) = EQfAt+1(St + Et (Dt ; At )  t)j(St )g: (4.59)
We can obtain a solution in limAt = limn!1A
n




t ) = EQfAt+1(St + Et (Ant )  t)j(Dt; St )g; n 2 N: (4.60)
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Starting at A0t = A

t+1, we abstract from the concrete situation (4.60) such that
'(s) = EQ((s; )j(s));
where  and s are R-valued and independent with respect to Q and  is a bounded Borel




for Qs-almost all s 2 S, where Q and Qs are image measures of Q under  ,S respectively.
This is equivalent to including the orthogonality:
determine ' 2 L2(R; ) such that for all  2 	;R
R2 ['(s)  (s; )] (s)(Q 
 )(; s) = 0;
(4.61)
where  is a measure equivalent to Qs and 	, whose linear space is dense in L2(R; ), stands
for the basis functions which are square-integrable with respect to . Therefore, we can apply




('(sk)  (sk; k)) (sk) = 0; (4.62)
with a nite set of basis functions
	 = f j : j = 1;    ; Jg
and an sample with enough size and appropriate distribution
V := (sk; k)
K
k=1  R2:
The solution to the problem (4.62) can be given by the root of a linear matrix equation
realizations (V ) = ((sk; k))
K
k=1 of  on the sample V ,
realizations M = ( j(sk))
K;J
k=1;j=1 of basis functions on V
as follows:
if q = (qj)
J
j=1 fulls Mq = (V ),
then (4.62) is solved by ' =
PJ
j=1 qj'j.
Based on the descriptions above and the assumption that (t)
T
t=1 are identically distributed,
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we can formulate an algorithm for the approximate solution to equation (4.59).
Market equilibrium in terms of risk neutral measure (4.63)
1) Initialization. Given sample V = (sk; k)
K
k=1  R2, choose a set of basis functions 	 =
( i)
J
j=1 on R which can describe the distribution of Q 
 , dene M as M = ( j(sk))K;Jk=1;j=1.
Set AT (s) = 1[0;1)(s) for all s 2 R and proceed in the next step with t := T   1.
2) Iteration. Dene A0t = At and proceed in the next step with n=0.







2.2) Derive a solution qn+1 2 RJ to Mqn+1 = n+1(V ).







k=1 jAn+1t (sk)  Ant (sk)j  , put n := n+ 1 and continue with step 2.1.
If
PK
k=1 jAn+1t (sk)  Ant (sk)j < , set t := t+ 1. If t > 1, go to step 2, otherwise nish.
It is widely known that EU ETS has suered from the low allowance prices since the
end of second phase of emission objective in 2012. The main reason for this malfunction of
EU ETS is the over allocation of free allowance. Therefore it is urgent to redeem and to
control the amount of free allowance. However, one may ask what is the perfect amount
of the allowance allocation which is not too generous to fail the emission reduction target
and not too strict to press intolerable burdens on market participants. Since the equilibrium
allowance price attained from the algorithm (4.63) is dependent on allowance shortage, we
calculate the shortage with respect to allowance prices which are high enough to trigger the
emission reduction and not too low to function as an incentive. We also compare these two
kinds of \Implied allowance shortage" and know what level of the shortage can maintain
a relatively high allowance price. To my best knowledge, it is the rst time that the idea
\Implied allowance shortage" is proposed. The purpose of introducing this notion is to set a
benchmark for the regulators that what portion of free allowance allocation is eective within
EU ETS.
Furthermore, having obtained the equilibrium allowance price at demandD = (Dt)
T 1
t=0 , the
market performance can be assessed in terms of the consumer's burden Bc(D), the producer's
x 4.3. Numerical examples 74









fC(Dt; At (Dt)) DtP (Dt; At (Dt))g








E(Dt; At (Dt)): (4.66)
For the penalty size  2 [0;1), we introduce the expected penalty payment with demand Dt
and emission price At at t = 0; 1;    ; T   1 as
((Dt)T 1t=0 ; (At)
T 1
t=0 ) = EQ(
T 1X
t=0







fE(Dt; At)  tg+ n)+(n)dn; (4.67)
where t can be understood as that regulator allocates the free emission allowance at each
time t = 0; 1;    ; T   1. We have also supposed that
with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q,
the uncontrollable emission N =
PT 1
t=0 t    follows a
distribution with pre-specied density  : R! R+:
9>=>; (4.68)
On the other hand, to simulate the energy demand at time t as well as the burdens of market
participants, we assume that
with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q,
the demands (Dt)
T 1
t=0 are identically distributed
with density  : [0;1)! R+.
9>=>; (4.69)
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To sum up, we shall emphasize that the energy mix model not only obtains the equilibrium
allowance price, but also provides an indicator called \Implied allowance shortage" which can
determine the allowance price directly. Furthermore, for the regulator, we provide quantitative
and qualitative view of the energy market based on the participants' burdens.
x 4.3.2 Numerical illustration of EU ETS
The coecients settings in this section are identical to that of the single period. Therefore we
can evaluate the performance of the multi-period model without bias. Having specied the
penalty  = 100 (EURO unit per tonne of pollutant), we introduce the density q : R3+ ! R+
describing a three technology market
q(c; e; v) = '1;21(c; e; v) + '2;22(c; e; v) + '3;23(c; e; v); (c; e; v) 2 R3+:
Here, '1;f21
(c; e; v) ,'2;22(c; e; v) and '3;23(c; e; v) are normal distributions that representing






















where 1, 2 and 3 are the mean values of the normal distributions of coal, oil and gas
respectively. We can see that cleaner technologies usually are more expensive and that is the
key reason to introduce emission market. We assume that the distributions of 1, 2 and 3
are valid for the entire energy generation, which we describe by choosing a relatively small
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standard deviation 1 = 2 = 3 = 0:02.
Having introduced the capacity density q, the functions V , C, E are dened by (4.53) {
(4.55), for each (At)
T 1
t=0 2 [0; ], we determine the solution to the problem (4.59), which in
our case is given by the Least-square Algorithm.












2  to maturity
3  to maturity
4  to  maturity
5  to  maturity
6  to maturity
Figure 4.1: Multi-period allowance price for T = 7.
Figure 4.1 shows that the equilibrium allowance price is strictly increasing with the relative
demand of emission reduction target before the terminal time. This is natural since higher
demand for emission reduction will result in higher allowance price. Furthermore, the price
change is steeper when the time goes, which conforms with the fact that the allowance price at
the terminal time is either zero or the penalty. Last but not the least, if the relative demand
is positive, the allowance price is increasing with respect to time t, which reects the time
value of the allowance price if the market is active.
We can also observe that Figure 4.1 is consistent with Figure 1 in [34], which applies the
Least-square Monte Carlo method as well. However, our model better reects the true price
of allowance because in [34] when the relative demand is around zero, the futures' price is
approaching 40 euros, which never happened in the real market. However, in Figure 4.1, the
futures' price is between 10 and 20 euros when the relative demand is in a balance. The
allowance price formation in our model corresponds to the real price trend in the rst phase
of EU ETS and the allowance price should be around that range to motivate the emission
reduction eectively, according to previous experience.
Moreover, let us demonstrate the burdens (4.66), (4.64) and (4.65) depending on the energy
demand. In order to fulll this target, we calculate the functions' arguments running through
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Figure 4.2: Emission burden with dierent relative demand.
























Figure 4.3: Consumers' burden with dierent relative demand.
the entire range of demand.
An interesting observation from Figure 4.2 is that the mean emission burden decreases
despite of the increasing allowance shortage. This is because less emission will be produced in
order to fulll the emission reduction target if the allowance shortage is higher than before.
However, when the allowance shortage is lower than some level, 5 units in this setting, the
emission reduction will cease because we must satisfy the energy demand before considering
the emission level.
Corresponding to the declined emission level, Figure 4.3 reveals that the consumers' burden
increases dramatically because it is required to pay extra emission costs, which grow fast if
the allowance shortage is high. Furthermore, the burden stops expanding when the allowance
shortage is around 5 units, proving again that no further emission abatement can be done
because of the energy demand requirement.
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x 4.3.3 Extended Cap-and-Trade scheme
Energy source mean cost emission rates emission rate(r=0.5) capacity
Fuel Oil 70 0.65 0.615 0.2
Gas 60 0.45 0.315 1.4
Coal 40 1 1.140 1.4
Table 4.1: Three representative producers.
tax/subsidy Consumers' burden producers' prots environmental burden
before 282.6 164.1 1.340
after(r=0.5) 260.2 130.2 1.334
improvement 7.93% 20.65 % 0.45%
Table 4.2: Corresponding burdens before and after tax/subsidy.
In Chapter 3, we have shown dierent emission rate before and after introducing the
extended cap-and-trade mechanism as stated in Table 4.1. Notice that in each time period,
market confronts with the energy mix provided by Table 4.1 and the improvement of burdens
diers from the single period situation as stated in Table 4.2. The consumers' and producers'
burdens decrease by 7:93% and 20:65% respectively while the numbers are 11:8% and 33:62%
in the single period case. Although the improvement is slightly lower because of the average
performance with respect to the allowance shortage in the multi-period setting, the extra
saving is still tempting both for the market participants and the policy makers. For instance,
the cost for emission reduction is about 1% of the total GDP of Europe, which is around the
U.S.$15,000 trillion. Therefore, more than the U.S.$ 10 trillion can be saved if the policy
makers take steps to introduce the extended cap-and-trade mechanism.
Observed from Figure 4.4 that the allowance price becomes lower after the extended cap-
and-trade mechanism is introduced if the allowance shortage is positive. This phenomenon
provides the foundation for the mitigation of burdens since the decreasing allowance price
results in the decline of the cost in emission reduction. In addition, the allowance price will
change very little if the allowance shortage is negative, implying that the extended cap-and-
trade mechanism does not work well if the emission market is not active, which means the
expected allowance shortage is too low to trigger emission reduction.
Figure 4.5 reveals the fact that the emission burden will be slightly alleviated despite of
the substantial savings in consumers' and producers' burdens. Namely, we can mitigate the
social burden and solve the windfall prots problems without compromising to the emission
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Figure 4.4: Allowance price before and after tax/subsidy.


























Figure 4.5: Environmental burden before and after tax/subsidy.
reduction target. The reason for this improvement is that the emission burden alleviation
requires less cost because of the decreased allowance price in the extended cap-and-trade
mechanism. In addition, extra emission will be redeemed as a result of the reallocation of the
energy mix observed from Figure 4.5.
An interesting result from Figure 4.6 is that there is an intersection between two burdens
lines, which shows that the improvement of the extended cap-and-trade mechanisms depends
on the social level of the allowance shortage. This partly explains why the improvement
in the multi-period setting is less substantial than the single period situation. However,
the unexpected shortcoming of the extended cap-and-trade mechanism only occurs when the
allowance shortage is almost zero, which is a rare case because emission market will reach the
balance only near the end of each period. However, a thorough analysis of the relationship
between the allowance shortage and performance of the extended cap-and-trade mechanism
does not belong to the research area of this thesis.
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Figure 4.6: Consumers' burden before and after tax/subsidy.
x 4.3.4 Implied allowance shortage
The analysis above has already stated the importance of the expected allowance shortage.
First, the allowance endures an excessively low price period such that producers prefer pur-
chasing the allowance to switch the energy structure, which results in the failure of EU ETS.
The expected allowance shortage is important because the allowance price is directly depen-
dent on it, observed from Figure 4.1. Second, previous subsection reveals that the expected
allowance shortage is crucial in implementing the extended cap-and-trade mechanism because
if the allowance shortage is close to zero, the social burden and the windfall prots will slight-
ly grow instead of meeting our objective of substantially decrease. Therefore it is urgent for
the policy makers as well as the market participants to nd an ecient method to evaluate
the expected allowance shortage in order to allow the emission trading mechanism to operate
sustainably and eectively.
Just like the implied volatility to present and predict the dynamics of the option pricing.
We can use the \Implied allowance shortage" as an indicator to evaluate the performance of the
allowance price as well as related nancial derivatives. In order to full this target, we obtain
the allowance prices (at)
T 1
t=0 from the real market and solve At(t) = at where t represents
the relative demand at time t. We compare the data at the beginning of the second phase
and third phase of EU ETS respectively. Because of the computational complexity of the high
dimensional problem, only data from the rst day of January, April, July and October are
applied, which will achieve the objective of summarizing the trend of the allowance shortage
eciently, because jumps are scarce in carbon emission market based on previous experience.
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The data is given by
a1 = (23:74; 29:26; 29:45; 18:42; 11:97; 17:42);
a2 = (4:78; 4:11; 5:03; 4:93; 5:58; 5:78):
Here, a1 and a2 are futures price at the maturity time of 2012 and 2020 respectively. Figure 4.7
















Figure 4.7: Implied shortage of allowance in phase II and phase III of EU ETS .
shows the dierence between the second and third phase of EU ETS. In the second phase, the
implied shortage is positive and the allowance price is high enough to motivate the producers
to reduce emissions. However, in the third phase, the implied shortage is negative which
means there is surplus free allocation in the market and therefore the allowance price is too
low to make EU ETS work eectively. This nding is very promising since the regulator
has a very straightforward benchmark to set appropriate free allocations. Furthermore, the
expected allowance shortage is around 5 units in the second period, which is the ideal amount
both for the allowance price and the extended cap-and-trade mechanism to work eciently.
There is little argument that the low allowance price is caused by the excessively free
allocation initially, which is called grandfathering in emission market. There will be inevitable
resistances from the producers if the allocations are redeemed by compulsory since they benet
from the vested interest. Auction may be one of the solutions believed by both the researchers
and the policy makers. Actually, at the beginning of the emission trading period, policy makers
asked each government to decide the emission allocation by auction or free. Only few countries
chose to apply the auction method because of the political obstructions.
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x 4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has oered several interesting results.
It rst conrms a result which is common to literatures on emission markets based on a
cap-and-trade system. That is it changes the merit order among the electricity production
technologies in the supply curve and triggers emission savings. Opportunity cost, includ-
ed in the prot function of a producer every time, generates two eects: they make clean
technologies cheaper and dirty technologies more expensive.
Our analysis however has also shown other relevant facts. It casts light on some conditions
which can hinder the benecial eects of an emission market. If the merit curve does not
provide exibility (e.g. there is only one technology in the market, or if the level of price
certicates are not suciently high to change the merit order), then the consumers just pay
more for electricity and no emission savings are gained by the society.
We also introduce a function for social costs of overall energy generation where, next to
the direct cost of production, the cost to society includes that of the emissions. In particular
we represent the social costs of emissions with the penalty due to all the tons of CO2 emitted
over the cap (remained uncovered). A major result of our analysis shows that even though
equilibrium on the power market is attained under the hypothesis that agents are risk averse,
the minimization of social costs obtained as if it is planned by a risk neutral policy maker.
We warn that this type of optimality must be taken with care. Indeed we prove that overall
prots are minimized.
Additionally, let us point out that the social optimality interpretation of the market equi-
librium emphasized in our work allows us to use the machinery of stochastic optimal control
for a direct construction and for a detailed quantitative analysis of the equilibrium-like market
situations. This approach seems to provide a sound theoretic framework to analyze properly
alternative regulation policies of emission markets.
Furthermore, the multi-period setting makes the theoretical part much more complex than
the single period model for the randomness of the production plan of each market participant
at each time period. We have given a rigorous proof of the existence of the equilibrium
allowance price and provided numerical examples based on this conclusion. Specically, the
allowance price and the social burdens can be presented in terms of the expected allowance
shortage at each time period. More importantly, we also examine the performance of the
extended cap-and-trade market and the result shows that the extra tax/subsidy mechanism
also works excellently under the multi-period situation.
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Finally, we propose the \Implied allowance shortage" inspired by the implied volatility in
the options market. \Implied allowance shortage" can be used as an indicator to present and to
predict the dynamics of the allowance price. Furthermore, the application of the extended cap-
and-trade mechanism requires the knowledge of the \Implied allowance shortage" in emission
reduction.
Chapter 5
Stochastic optimal control model
x 5.1 Introduction
The rst optimal control model in emission market dates back to [12] where the authors rst
introduce the banking of emissions. [14] extends the model by considering an innite-horizon
optimization problem and includes both the banking and borrowing in the model. Other than
focusing on the central planner, [20] proposes a model based on the representative agents'
optimal abatement strategy. The authors' model is novel and very applicable because there
is a closed form solution of the allowance price with the assumptions that the abatement
function is quadratic, interest rate is zero and the volatility is constant. [44] rst considers
the existence of price jumps in emission market, especially in the rst period of EU ETS. The
authors explore the continuous model based on risk-neutral setting and jump diusions. The
most recent and comprehensive paper applying optimal control theorem in emission market
attributes to [45], in which the authors divide the producers into three categories: small
carbon producers, large carbon producers who cannot aect the risk premia by production,
large carbon producers who can change the risk premia by their productions.
There are many reasons to introduce the stochastic optimal control model into the emission
market. Many benets can be brought about while the discrete models lack. First, we can nd
the intrinsic connection between the allowance price and the social burden. More importantly,
it is possible to have a closed form solution, which is very appealing both to the researchers
and the market traders. Last but not the least, vanilla and path-dependent options can be
priced numerically.
Moreover, the newly founded Chinese emission market has drawn more and more attentions
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globally since China has become the No.1 carbon emission producer and China is urgently
looking for an energy structure switching from the pollution intensive energies like coal to more
environmentally friendly ones like gas and oil. Therefore, it is safe to predict that emission
market in China will become increasingly active and important. Our model applies Vecer's
method [43] in Asian options and provides numerical solutions accordingly in emission market.
Specically, we use the market data from China Trading Scheme to price the options.
x 5.2 Mathematical models
x 5.2.1 Market materials
Let (
;F ; P; fFtgt2[0;T ]) be a ltered probability space, we assume that all the processes
considered are adapted to fFtgt2[0;T ]. In a market with a nite number I of agents confronted
with emission reduction, the central planner focuses on minimizing the total expected cost
over time T .
Overall allowance shortage: First, we introduce the stochastic process Et which represents
the dynamics of the 'business-as-usual' emission. Let  be the total allowance allocations by
the central authority, then the overall allowance shortage is presented by
ET = ET   :
Abatement Costs: We assume that the cost of abatement is a random function of the
reduced volume. The randomness is due to uncertainty in prices (of fuel) and is observable
at the corresponding time. Thus, if the reduction of emissions at time t is x 2 [0;1) units, it
causes costs Ct(x; !), where Ct : [0;1)
  ! R is B([0;1))
Ft-measurable and for xed
(t; !), we assume Ct(; !) is strictly increasing, convex and dierentiable with Ct(0; !) = 0.
Abatement Volume: Let us introduce, for each ! 2 
 and a 2 [0;1), the abatement
volume ct(a; !) as:
ct(a; !) := argminfCt(x; !)  ax : x 2 [0; Et(!)]g: (5.1)
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For xed (t; !); Ct(; !) is a strictly increasing function, therefore the inverse function C 1t (; !)




Here and for the rest of this chapter, we omit ! from notation for convenience. Denote
ut = ct(At) with the interpretation of abatement rate. Note that ut is a well dened ran-
dom variable because for given (t; !); ut(!) = ct(At(!); !). Therefore, the accumulated






U = [0; ];where  sets a cap for the abatement volume;
Ut = fu : [t; T ] 
R ! U is an adapted process taking values in Ug:
There is no need to include allowance trading from the planner's perspective because
buyers and sellers must have a zero net supply for the whole market. Therefore, the nal
fullment of the emission allowance GT is given by




x 5.2.2 Continuous time model and HJB approach
Introduce (Et)t2[0;T ] as Et = E(ET jFt) with the interpretation of the expected allowance short-
age by time t, then the fullment of the emission allowance at time t is




which is equivalent to
dGt = (t; Gt)dWt   utdt; (5.2)
where Wt is the standard one dimensional Wienner process and dEt = (t; Gt)dWt. If the







e rtCt(ut)dt  e rTp G+T g;
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where p stands for the penalty price. Let





e r(s t)Cs(us)ds  pe r(T t)G+T g; (5.3)
then by the dynamic programming principle,





e r(s t)Cs(us)ds+ e rhv(t+ h;Gt+h)g: (5.4)
Assuming v is smooth enough, we can apply Ito's lemma




























































v(T;GT ) =  pG+T :
We show that the optimal strategy exists.
Lemma 2 For any t 2 [0; T ], there exists an optimal strategy u 2 Ut to equation (5.3).
Proof. We still denote Gt = x and let J(u; t; x) = Ef 
R T
t
C(us)ds   p(Gt;xT )+g, then it
suces to prove that for every (t; x) 2 [0; T ]  R, there exists u 2 Ut such that v(t; x) =
supu2Ut J(u; t; x) = J(u
; t; x).
x 5.2. Mathematical models 88
Let fuig, i = 1; 2;    be a sequence such that J(uj; t; x) " v(t; x). Since U is a compact




juitj2dtg  K; for 8i  1:
Therefore, there exists a subsequence which is still denoted by ui, such that
ui  ! u weakly in L2F([0; T ];R);
where












such that eui  ! u strongly in L2F([0; T ];R). Since U is convex and compact, u 2 U [t; T ].






T strongly in L2F([0; T ];R):
Since functions C(x) and x+ are convex, the inequality holds that








i+j; t; x) = sup
u2U [t;T ]
J(u; t; x):
x 5.2.3 Equilibrium allowance price
If we denote the equilibrium allowance price [48] by A(t; Gt), thanks to the conclusion that
the discounted equilibrium allowance price is equal to the marginal abatement cost [11], we
can get
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The existence of the optimal strategy in lemma 2 therefore indicates the existence of the
equilibrium allowance price. (5.8) is also equivalent to
ut = ct(e
 rtA(t; Gt)); (5.9)
which means the equilibrium abatement volume can be obtained by the equilibrium allowance
price. Notice that, from (5.7) and (5.8), we get
e rtA(t; Gt) =  @v(t; Gt)
@Gt
: (5.10)
And in a nancial market without arbitrage opportunity, the discounted allowance price must
be a martingale under risk neutral measure. Then by Ito's formula
de rtA(t; Gt) = f@A
(t; Gt)
@t









gdt+ e rtA(t; Gt)(t; Gt)dW t ; (5.11)
whereW t is the Brownian motion under the risk neutral measure. The martingale property of
e rtA(t; Gt) indicates that the coecient of dt term in de rtA(t; Gt) must be zero. Therefore
@A(t; Gt)
@t










A(T;GT ) = p1G+T : (5.12)
Next, we shift the time variable to solve the quasilinear equation of the allowance price and
assume the interest rate r = 0 without loss of generality. Let
v(t; x) = v(T   t; x); A(t; ) = A(T   t; ); (5.13)


















v(0; x) =  px+:
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A(0; x) = p1fx>0g: (5.15)
Although we cannot solve (5.7) in most of the cases, (5.12) can be attained analytically under
some special assumptions and numerically in general. (5.10) is equivalent to




if we let Gt = x. Therefore v(t; x) can be solved by obtaining the solution of A
(t; x).
The quasilinear type equation (5.15) has been studied by numerous papers. Specically [49]
gives sucient conditions for the existence of a unique classical solution. However, theorems
in [49] require the abatement volume function c to be Lipshitz continuous and the terminal
condition to be A(T; ) 2 C1. Unfortunately, in (5.15), A(T; ) is not even continuous. Another
important conclusion of [49] is that the solution is smooth and depends continuously on the
terminal condition on C1 topology. Therefore it is natural to approximate p1fx>0g by p1+e lx

















for l = 1; 2;    .
Before researching into the numerical solution, we propose the comparison result that the
equilibrium allowance and the approximated price are bounded by 0 and the penalty price p.
Proposition 10 Consider (; x) 2 [0; T ]  R, the solution (; x) to equations (5.15) with
initial boundary condition (0; x) = p1fx>0g and solution l(; x) to equations (5.17) with
smooth boundary condition l(0; x) = p
1+e lx satisfy the maximum principle:
(
0  (; x)  p;
0 < l(; x) < p:
(5.18)
Proof. Because At = (t; Gt) is a martingale due to the no arbitrage assumption, where  is
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the solution to the original problem (5.12) and the process fGtg given by (5.2) is a Markovian
process, we have almost surely
(t;Xt) = E(AT j Ft) = E((T;XT ) j Ft) = E((T;XT ) j Xt):
Therefore for  = T   t,
(; x) = (t; x) = E((T;XT ) j Xt = x)
= E((0; XT ) j Xt = x) = E(h(XT ) j Xt = x);
which immediately implies the rst part of (5.18). The second part of (5.18) can be proved
by standard maximum comparison principle in quasilinear parabolic equations [50].
x 5.2.4 Finite dierence method
Note that the quasilinear parabolic partial dierential equation (5.17) can be solved analyti-
cally only in a few cases. For example, when the abatement volume function c is linear, (5.17)
can be transformed to Burger's equation and a related example will be discussed specically
in the next section.
However, in most of the situations, we can only obtain the numerical solutions. In this
section, we will present how to apply the Finite dierence method to approximate the solution
to (5.17).
First, we set D = f 2 R j  j< g in order to truncate the domain in x dimension. Here
 > 0 can be chosen so that the probability for the random variable Gt to leave D during
the time interval [0; T ], giving staring point G0, is less than .










such that the probability for Gt dened by (5.2) to leave D := f 2 R : jj < g during time
interval [0; T ] with G0 = 0 is less than .
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Proof. By (5.2), we know



















The abatement volume function c is non-decreasing and non-negative, therefore we know
0  R t
0




(s)ds, thus Mt   c(p)  t  Gt Mt and we have




2(s)ds+ c2(p)t2 = kt:
















Since c is a non-negative function and fG2tg0tT is a submartingale, by Kolmogorov-Doob
inequality [51] we obtain,
P ( sup
0tT








Let N+1 denotes the total number of discrete values of t-variable and M denotes the total
number of discrete values of x-variable. The step size for t and x are t = T
N
and x = 2
M
respectively. Then tn = nt, xi =   + ix for i = 1; 2;    ;M and n = 0; 1;   N . We
denote Ani as the approximation value at (tn; xi) and A(tn; xi) as the real value of equation
(5.15) at point (tn; xi). Furthermore, for the value outside domain D, a straightforward
setting of uni outside D is
Ani =
(
p if xi  ;
0 if xi   :
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Therefore, we are looking for a solution to fAni g on the grid, such that for n = 0; 1;   N and


























































Furthermore, we set the volatility (t) to be constant  for computational convenience.
Proposition 12 Scheme (5.20) is convergent if the following conditions hold.
i) The volatility satises
x  c(p) < 2 < x   ;where  = x
t
: (5.21)
ii) The abatement volume function is Lipshitz continuous such that there exists L > 0 and for
any x; y 2 [ ; ], jc(x)  c(y)j < Ljx  yj.
Proof. Let eni = A(tn; xi)   Ani and dene the l1 norm of en = (en1 ; en2 ;    ; enM) to be
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kenk1 = sup1iM jeni j, then it suces to prove that limt#0 kenk1 = 0. Denote
ni =
A(tn+1; xi)  A(tn; xi)
t
+ c(A(tn; xi))





A(tn; xi+1) + A(tn; xi 1)  2A(tn; xi)
x2
:
By the standard consistency analysis [52], we know ni = O(t) + O(x). Notice that the
accuracy is dierent from linear parabolic equation, which is O(t)+O(x2), because of the













fni = c(A(tn; xi))







fni = [c(A(tn; xi))  c(Ani )]





= [c(A(tn; xi))  c(Ani )][
@A
@x

























since the linear abatement volume function c is Lipshitz continuous and jc(A(tn; xi)) c(Ani )j 
Ljeni j. Furthermore, [50] shows the existence of a smooth solution A of (5.17). Therefore, in
the compact set [0; T ]  [ ; ], there exists some K > 0 such that @A
@x
(tn; xi)  K for any
n = 1; 2;    ; N and i = 1; 2;    ;M .
Taking absolute value and considering the l1 norm on both hand sides of (5.25), we derive
ken+1k1  (jF ni j+ jGni j+ jHni j)kenk1 + LMtkenk1 +t O(t+x): (5.26)
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Therefore (5.26) can be transformed to
ken+1k1  (1 + LKt)kenk1 +2t O(1 + 1

) =)
ken+1k1  t O(1 + 1





ken+1k1  t O(1 + 1

)  exp(LKT )
LK
 ke0k1 (t = T
N
):
And we obtain our conclusion that limt#0 kenk1 = 0.
x 5.2.5 Option pricing
Nowadays, the majority of contracts in emission markets are still forward and futures. Howev-
er, the option market has grown dramatically since the rst option contract of CO2 emission
was traded between the French electricity company EDF and the Amsterdam based company
Statkraft in 2005. The option market has been developing prosperously for more than 40 years
since the invention of the famous Black-Scholes-Merton Model, which was rst published in
1973.
There are several advantages of introducing options in emission market. First, like all the
other nancial derivatives, the CO2 option contracts can satisfy the primary need for both the
producers who wish to reduce the risk of allowance shortage and speculators who are willing
to take the risk for future prots. Namely, options essentially act as mediums to transfer risk
between dierent market participants. Moreover, CDM ad JI mechanisms, which are project
based investments, can be viewed as option contracts. Because such mechanisms can help
the investments at a regular interval return CO2 emission reduction certicates, which yield
a payo depending on the CO2 market price. Furthermore, these investment projects can
be interpreted as contracts whose value derive from the future CO2 allowance spot prices.
Simultaneously, any abatement measure or production modication can be evaluated as both
saving and purchasing emission allowance of selling from extra unused certicates.
None of the existing papers, to our best knowledge, have discussed the exotic options in
emission market. As China and other developing countries have paid increasingly attentions
to adopting and developing emission market, there must be vast demands for option pricing
in these countries and the vanilla option might be no longer sucient for the applicable usage.
Next, we will present how to price the European and Asian options given the mathematical
structure discussed previously. Although a closed form solution is not approachable currently,
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we can derive numerical solutions to the options prices by the Finite dierence method and
Monte Carlo method.
European option
Provided with the allowance price fAtgt2[0;T ], we can prove that the European option price
follows the same type of parabolic equation with (5.12). The dierences between them are
the nonlinear term and the terminal condition. In order to prove this, we rst notice that Gt
given by the strong solution of (5.2) has the Markovian property. Provided with the maturity
time  2 [0; T ], for any time t 2 [0;  ], the European call option is given by
Ct = E

(A(;G ) K)+ j Ft

= Ef(A(;G ) K)+ j Gt = xg = f  (t; Gt): (5.27)
By Ito's formula
df  (t; Gt) = [
















In a fair market with no arbitrage opportunity, Ct = f
 (t; Gt) must be a martingale with
respect to the risk-neutral measure. Therefore, the drift term in equation (5.28) is zero, let
Gt = x, the option price f
 (t; x) is the solution to the following parable equation









@2f  (t; x)
x2
= 0; (5.29)
for (t; x) 2 [0;  ]R where the boundary condition is given by
f  (; x) = (A(; x) K)+: (5.30)
Notice that (5.29) is actually a linear parabolic equation and the Finite dierence method for
this type is quite typical [54]. Following the previous discussions, we can obtain an algorithm
for the European option.
Algorithm 1
Step 1. Derive the allowance spot price A(t; x) in (5.20).
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Step 2. For any strike price K  0 and maturity time  , apply the Finite dierence method
to solve (5.29) with the boundary condition (5.30).
Step 3. Provided with time t and given the exogenous spot price a 2 [0; P ] from the market,
solve the equation A(t; x) = a for the expected shortage of allowance x at time t.
Step 4. The European call option price at time t can be obtained directly from step 2 and 3.
Asian option
Asian option is an exotic option with terminal value determined by the average price of the
underlying assets over the whole period. In the nancial market, traders sometimes are more
interested in hedging over the average price of a commodity rather than the terminal value. For
instance, manufacturers regularly purchase cement from other producers are more concerned
with acquiring price protection from the average price over the purchasing period. The main
motivation for inventing the Asian option is to prevent the price manipulations at the end
of the terminal time. There are plenty of papers about the Asian options. Comprehensive
discussions and summaries can be found in [55] and [56]. Specically, we follow the classical
dimension reduction method from [43], [57] and [58].







Therefore the value of an Asian option at time t with maturity time T is
CAt = Ef(IT  K)+ j Ftg = Ef(IT  K)+ j (a1; a2;    a tt )g: (5.32)
Consider a portfolio with one unit of Asian option and   units of the allowance. We can
derive the PDE of the option price by applying the rst fundamental theorem of the asset
pricing. Since the portfolio value  is given by
 = V (A; I; t) A:























A(t; Gt) is continuous for t 2 (0; T ] provided with the time shifting from t to T   t. Therefore









A(t; Gt)dt = A(t; Gt)dt; (5.34)
where t  t  t+t. From the derivative of A(t; Gt), we know
dA(t; Gt) =  (t)@A(t; Gt)
@x
dWt: (5.35)










































Solving equation (5.36) is dicult since we have two variables A and I. However, we can utilize
the variable reduction method to attain a single variable parabolic equation. Let









with K to be the given strike price. Specically, the call asian option CAt with xed strike
x 5.2. Mathematical models 99
price K at time t can be derived by

























dug is a function of yt
only. Then we have




















































y)2 as volatility part, equation (5.41) is nothing but a linear
parabolic equation. We can also provide an algorithm given the allowance price of the time
interval [0; t] for the Asian option at time t.
Algorithm 2
Step 1. We dene a grid f0;t;    ; t;    ; Tg for the t variable. Let n = t=t, given the
exogenous allowance prices fa0; a1;    ; ang for the grid ft0; t1;    ; tng with ti = it, solve
the equations A(ti; xi) = ai for i = 1; 2;    ; n.
Step 2. Calculate @A
@x
at the points (ti; xi)0in and the Finite dierence method can be applied
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accordingly [54].
Step 3. In step 2, we obtain solution g as a matrix with respect to t and y. Given the strike
price K, yt can be derived by (5.38) and therefore we obtain g(t; yt).
Step 4. Obtain the European call option price by At  g(t; yt).
x 5.3 Numerical examples
In this section, we provide two numerical examples. The rst one is the abatement volume
function which is linear and therefore an explicit solution to equations (5.12) can be obtained,
because (5.12) is essentially a Burger's equation in this case. Then we consider the numerical
solutions for the nonlinear abatement volume function where the Finite dierence method can
be applied accordingly.
x 5.3.1 Linear example





Then the abatement volume function is linear: c(x) = (C
0
) 1(x) = cx and the volatility
(t) =  is a constant. Therefore, (5.12) is equivalent to
@A
@t








(t; x) = 0;
A(0; x) = p1x+ : (5.43)
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This is a typical Burger's equation, and the solution to (5.43) is (see [59] chapter 4).













)  (x  cptp
t
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Figure 5.1: The spot price with dierent allowance shortage and time.
Here, we set c = 0:02, penalty =100 and  = 1 for the parameters of the allowance price
and for the rest of this section.
Observed from Figure 5.1, we know that the allowance price is strictly non-decreasing
with respect to the relative demand, meaning that the allowance price is a direct reection
of the expected overall allowance shortage of the market. Furthermore, when the allowance
shortage is positive, the allowance price is strictly increasing with respect to the time. This
phenomenon shows the time value of the allowance shortage fulllment, indicating that it will
cost more to reduce emission if the time is approaching to the closure of each period.
We also give the value function of the central planner. By equation vx(t; x) =  At(x) and
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v(t; 1) = 0, we derive


































Figure 5.2: Central planner's cost with dierent expected shortage and time.
The graph of the negative value function is presented by Figure 5.2. It is obvious for
the negative social value to have similar trend as the allowance price because of the function
(5.45).
Volatility of Allowance Price
From (5.11), we know that for r = 0







is the volatility of allowance price at time t given the allowance shortage












Since the allowance shortage x can be solved directly by the allowance price a, we draw a 3D
graph of the price volatility.























Figure 5.3: Allowance price volatility with dierent expected shortage and time.
Figure 5.3 reects the market reality as expected. The maximum point in the allowance
shortage direction is in the middle of the allowance price. Additionally, the volatility approach-
es to zero when the allowance price either raises to the penalty price or drops to zero. In the
time direction, the volatility is increasing. At the end of the trading period T, the volatility is
the penalty price, which represents the maximum possibility of price uctuation. This result
is also important for the nancial market trader because the potential market buyer or seller
will usually rst observe the allowance price before purchasing the option contracts. If the
allowance price fails to yield an increasing volatility structure, it will signicantly undermines
the accuracy of the option pricing.
European and Asian Options
For the linear case, we apply the Monte Carlo method to equation (5.27) and (5.32) to price
the European and Asian options. European option for example, rst we solve the allowance








G(n+1)t = Gnt   c(A(nt; Gnt)) + (0; (nt))
p
t:
Here the second equality is an iterative method to get G with (0; ) representing a random
number of normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation (nt))
p
t. Finally, the
European option can be directly calculated by (5.27) given enough sample size.
For the Asian option, we observe from (5.41) and (5.42) that for the random variable Yt
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given by
dYt = dt  @A
@x
YtdWt; (5.46)
the solution to equations (5.41) and (5.42) can be expressed by
g(t; y) = Ef(TT )+ j Yt = yg; (5.47)
according to the Feynman-Kac formula [60]. Since the solution to (5.46) can be derived
explicitly by















and notice that Yt =
tIt KT
At
with It; At given, we can approximate YT by the Monte Carlo
method similar to the European option because (5.47) is essentially an European option with
strike price 0. Therefore the Asian option can be obtained by (5.39).
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the emission European option with dierent strike prices and
maturity time. It is obvious to observe that the option price is strictly decreasing with the
strike price and strictly increasing with the maturity time, which reects the time value of
the European type option.
However, in Figure 5.5, the Asian option price varies very little with respect to the maturity
time because of the average terminal condition. Furthermore, Asian option is much more
cheaper than the European option which proves that the emission option is suitable for the
less developed Asian market.
Figure 5.6 shows that the emission European option price is very close to BS formula price,
corresponding to the rumor that EU ETS indeed applied BS formula to price the option at
the novice stages of emission market. For the Asian option, we assume the terminal condition







A closed form solution of this kind of Asian option can be derived and the dierence between
BS type and the emission options is not obvious. The BS formula seems applicable in the
emission option market. However, the result in Figure 5.7 undermines the foundation of this
conclusion since Figure 5.6 only represents the trend of the options where the maturity time
approaches to the closure time of each period.
Furthermore, in Figure 5.7 the emission options are tremendously less than the BS type
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options, especially for the European type. Therefore BS type option is not the ideal choice for
the option pricing in the emission market and our methods to price the European and Asian



















































Figure 5.5: Asian options with dierent maturity time and strike price.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between European and Asian options and Black Scholes formulas
with dierent strike price.













Figure 5.7: Comparison between European and Asian options and Black Scholes formulas
with dierent maturity time.
x 5.3.2 Nonlinear example
In this subsection, we introduce a nonlinear example with the abatement volume function
c(x) = cx
3




 x 52 ; x  0.
Therefore the abatement volume function satises the Lipschitz continuous condition and the
abatement cost function is convex, which are the prerequisite conditions for Algorithm 1 and
2.
In our numerical example, we set maturity time T = 1, the grids for the t axis and x
axis are t = 0:01 and x = 0:1 respectively. The volatility, the truncation parameter for
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allowance shortage and the penalty price are  = 0:9,  = 5 and p = 100 and therefore the
convergence conditions for Algorithm 1 and 2 are fullled. (see Proposition 5.22)
Since we cannot have a closed form solution of At(x), for any (t; x) 2 [0; T ]R, we choose
to apply the Lagrangian interpolation to approximate the allowance price. It turns out that
the approximation is extremely accurate when the allowance price is not too low nor too high.
From Figure 5.8, we can observe that the allowance price is almost linear for each t when
the domain is within [10; 90]. From previous discussions, we know that this is the trusted
domain where the emission trading scheme can work eciently. Algorithm 1 and 2 can be
applied to derive the European and Asian options prices. Although the explicit prices are not
like the linear case, the trend of the nonlinear case is similar. However, for dierent strike
prices, the gap between the European and Asian Options is even bigger than the linear case.
Furthermore, the overall option prices are too high for the market usage which implies that




















Figure 5.8: Allowance price with dierent time.













Figure 5.9: European and Asian option with dierent maturity.
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Figure 5.10: European and Asian option with dierent strike.
x 5.4 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates an optimal control model involving the maximization of the central
planner's prot. A closed form solution of the allowance price can be derived if the abatement
volume function is linear. For the nonlinear situation, the numerical solution can be obtained
both by Finite dierence method and Monte Carlo method. Furthermore, the social burden
value is derived as the integration of the allowance prices. Finally, European and Asian options
can be attained numerically both for the linear and nonlinear abatement volume functions. A
comparison with Black-Scholes type option is also provided to present that our model is more
suitable for options pricing in carbon emission market.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have proposed three dierent models to solve the key problems in emission
market. First, pricing the allowance price and related nancial derivatives. Second, reducing
the windfall prots of the producers. Finally, solving current problems of EU ETS and provid-
ing suggestions to the newly founded Chinese emission market. All of these three models are
designed to derive the allowance price, which is the fundamental problem of emission market
and the prerequisite for the other critical issues.
In Chapter 3, we apply the energy mix model to tackle the severe windfall prots problem
of emission market. This is very important for the development of the emission reduction
scheme because by adopting our suggestions, the overloaded burdens of the customers will be
reduced tremendously while the emission level will be kept at similar level.
The multi-period model in Chapter 4 is a theoretical supplement to the single period
energy mix model. Furthermore, the \Implied allowance shortage" is proposed to serve as an
indicator for the allowance price.
Last but not the least, an HJB model is discussed in Chapter 5 and therefore a solid
numerical connection between the social burden and the allowance price is formed. By solving
the PDE of the allowance price, we can derive the social burden value and European, Asian
options both in linear and nonlinear situations.
For the future work, we need to consider random demand of the energy mix model, which
is essentially the problem of \Curse of dimensionality". Furthermore, banking and borrowing
between dierent periods of EU ETS need to be evaluated to analyze their eects on the
allowance pricing. Finally, the newly founded Chinese emission market requires thoroughly
research based on the domestic executive policies.
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